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ABSTRACT

SEU-INDUCED PERSISTENT ERROR PROPAGATION IN FPGAS

Keith Shearl Morgan
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Master of Science

This thesis introduces a new way to characterize the dynamic SEU cross section of an FPGA design in terms of its persistent and non-persistent components. An
SEU in the persistent cross section results in a permanent interruption of service until
reset. An SEU in the non-persistent cross section causes a temporary interruption of
service, but in some cases this interruption may be tolerated. Techniques for measuring these cross sections are introduced. These cross sections can be measured and
characterized for an arbitrary FPGA design. Furthermore, circuit components in the
non-persistent and persistent cross section can statically be determined. Functional
error mitigation techniques can leverage this identification to improve the reliability of some applications at lower costs by focusing mitigation on just the persistent
cross section. The reliability of a practical signal processing application in use at Los
Alamos National Laboratory was improved by nearly two orders of magnitude at a
theoretical savings of over 53% over traditional comprehensive mitigation techniques
such as full TMR.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to first thank my wife Natalie for her many acts of selflessness.
She has stuck with me through many late nights in the lab. She has also been my
greatest support.
I would also like to thank my family, particularly my parents, for their their
encouragement and financial support.
I would also like to thank my advisor, Dr. Michael Wirthlin. He has spent
countless hours on my behalf. I particularly want to thank him for challenging me
technically and pushing me to become a better writer.
I also want to thank my professors and fellow students at BYU. They have all
helped mold me in a positive way.
Finally I want to thank the folks at Los Alamos National Laboratory. They are
not only great colleagues but friends as well. They supported this work through the
“Improving the Reliability of FPGA Designs through Automated Design Hardening”
program under contract #95952-001-04 3C.

Contents
Acknowledgments

vi

List of Tables

xii

List of Figures

xvii

1 Introduction

1

1.1

Benchmark Designs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

1.2

Orbits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

1.3

Organization

3

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 Radiation Effects and FPGAs

5

2.1

Space Radiation Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

2.2

Single Event Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

2.3

Static SEU Cross Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

2.4

FPGA Static SEU Cross Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

2.5

Orbit Specific Static SEU Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

2.6

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

3 Dynamic Cross Section

15

3.1

Dynamic Single Event Upsets in FPGAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

3.2

Measuring Dynamic Cross Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

3.3

Dynamic Cross Section Measurements

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

3.4

MTBF Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

3.4.1

22

Calculating MTBF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vii

3.4.2
3.5

Orbit-Specific MTBF Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

4 Persistent Functional Errors

25

4.1

Related Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

4.2

Scrubbing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

4.3

Non-Persistent Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

4.4

Persistent Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

4.5

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32

5 Persistent Cross Section

33

5.1

Non-Persistent Cross section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

5.2

Persistent Cross section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

5.3

Measuring Persistent Cross Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40

5.3.1

Persistent Testing Methodologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

5.3.2

Persistent Cross Section Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

MTBF Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

5.4.1

Application Service Interruption Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . .

48

5.4.2

Calculating MTBF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

5.4.3

Orbit-Specific MTBF Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

5.4

5.5

6 Functional Error Mitigation

53

6.1

Design Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

54

6.2

Full Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

54

6.3

Partial Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

6.4

Modified Persistent Cross Section Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

6.5

Modified MTBF Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

6.6

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

7 Summary and Conclusion

61

viii

Bibliography

71

A Benchmark Designs

75

A.1 Multiplier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

A.2 Counter Array . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

A.3 Synthetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

A.4 DSP Kernel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

B Space Radiation Environment

79

B.1 Trapped Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

B.2 Cosmic Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80

B.2.1 Galactic Cosmic Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

B.2.2 Solar Cosmic Radiation

82

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C Testing Methodologies

85

C.1 Test-Fixture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

C.2 Fault-Injection

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

C.3 Radiation Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

C.4 Testing Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

89

D Correlation of Accelerator Data to Simulation Results

91

D.1 Data Collection Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

D.1.1 Output Error Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

D.1.2 SEU Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

D.2 Data Collection Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

D.2.1 Output Error Thread . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

D.2.2 Bitstream Fault Thread . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

D.3 Testing Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95

D.4 Data Correlation Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

D.5 Sensitivity Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
D.6 Persistence Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
D.6.1 Detection Algorithm 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
ix

D.6.2 Prediction Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
D.6.3 Detection Algorithm 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
D.7 Accounting for Testing Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
E Predicting On-Orbit SEU Rates

111

E.1 Software Packages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
E.2 Integral Rectangular Parallelepiped Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
E.3 Rate Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
E.4 AP-8 Trapped Proton Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
E.5 JPL 1991 Solar Proton Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
E.6 CREME96 Cosmic Radiation Model

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

E.7 Static SEU Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

x

List of Tables
2.1

Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA Static SEU Proton Saturation Cross
Section[1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

Proton Static Cross Section Measurements for the Configuration Memory
of a Set of Xilinx FPGAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

Static SEU Rate Forecast for a Single Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA in
Several Different Orbits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

3.1

Dynamic Cross Section Predictions and Measurements† . . . . . . . . .

20

3.2

On-Orbit Mean Time Between Failure Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

5.1

Sequence of Inputs and Outputs for a 4-bit Adder Circuit . . . . . . . .

36

5.2

Sequence of Inputs and Outputs for a 4-bit Adder Circuit . . . . . . . .

40

5.3

Persistent Cross Section Predictions and Measurements . . . . . . . . .

45

5.4

Cross Section Predictions and Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

5.5

Modified On-Orbit Mean Time Between Failure Estimates . . . . . . .

51

6.1

Modified Persistent Cross Section Predictions and Measurements . . . .

56

6.2

Modified On-Orbit Mean Time Between Failure Estimates for Tolerant
Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

A.1

Resource Utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

D.1

Confidence Intervals for Tested Designs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

E.1

Solar Condition Categories and the Set of Values Necessary to Calculate
a Total Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

2.2

2.3

xi

E.2

Input Parameters to Predict SEU Rates in SPACERAD due to Trapped
Protons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

E.3

Input Parameters to Create a Trapped Proton Energy Transport File in
SPACERAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

E.4

Input Parameters to Create a Spacecraft Shielding File in the SPACERAD Package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

E.5

Input Parameters to Create Trapped Proton Environment Files in SPACERAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

E.6

Input Parameters to Create Orbit Files in SPACERAD . . . . . . . . . 114

E.7

Input Parameters to Predict Solar Proton SEU Rates in SPACERAD . 115

E.8

Input Parameters to Create a Solar Proton Energy Transport File in
SPACERAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

E.9

Input Parameters to Create a Solar Proton Environment File in SPACERAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

E.10 Input Parameters to Create Geomagnetic Shielding Files for the SPACERAD Software Package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
E.11 Input Parameters to Predict Heavy Ion SEU Rates in CREME96

. . . 117

E.12 Input Parameters to Convert an Energy Transport File to an LET Spectrum in CREME96 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
E.13 Input Parameters to Create an Energy Transport File in CREME96 . . 117
E.14 Input Parameters to Create an Energy Transport File in CREME96 . . 118
E.15 Input Parameters to Create Geomagnetic Shielding Files in the CREME96
Package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
E.16 Static SEU Rate Forecast for a Single Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA in
Several Different Orbits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

xii

List of Figures
2.1

Van Allen trapped radiation belts around the earth [2]. . . . . . . . . .

6

2.2

The different classes of soft and hard errors collectively known as Single
Event Effects [3]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

Proton SEU configuration latch per-bit cross sections for the XCV1000
FPGA fit to the Weibull distribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

Heavy ion SEU configuration latch per-bit cross sections for the XCV1000
FPGA fit to the Weibull distribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

A simplified schematic representation of one configurable logic block in
an FPGA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

Representation of an FPGA configurable logic block. The top half of
the block is programmed to perform a 2-input logical OR function. The
output of this function is latched in a user flip-flop. The bottom half of
the block is not configured. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

Representation of a configured FPGA logic block upset by an SEU. In
this case, the particle strike corrupted the top LUT so that its function
switched to a 2-input logical XOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

Comparison of the resource utilization and dynamic cross section for
a Counter Array design. The diagram on the left is a screen capture
of the resource layout of the design. The right diagram is a graphical
representation of the portion of the Counter Array design layout which
constitutes its dynamic cross section. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

Comparison of resource utilization and dynamic cross section for the
Synthetic design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

Comparison of resource utilization and dynamic cross section for the
DSP Kernel design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

2.3

2.4

2.5

3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

xiii

3.6

4.1

4.2

4.3

5.1

5.2

5.3

5.4

5.5

5.6

5.7

Comparison of the relative size of the dynamic to static cross section for
several designs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

A typical scrubbing circuit reads the configuration memory one block at
a time, compares each block against a golden copy, and repairs all upset
bits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

Plot of the difference between the outputs of a DUT and golden circuit
before, during and after a configuration upset. The upset generated
non-persistent functional errors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

Plot of the difference between the outputs of a DUT and golden circuit
before, during and after a configuration upset. The upset generated
persistent functional errors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

The diagram on the left represents the generic relationship between static
and dynamic cross section. The diagram on the right shows the nonpersistent and persistent components of the dynamic cross section. . . .

34

The feed-forward sections of a circuit, outlined with the dashed line,
belong to the non-persistent cross section. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

Simplified schematic representation of a 4-bit full-adder implemented in
an FPGA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

Simplified schematic representation of a 4-bit full-adder implemented in
an FPGA. The bit stored at address 0x3 in the LUT second from the
top was flipped from a 0 to a 1 by an SEU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

The feed-back sections of a circuit belongs to the persistent cross section.
Feed-forward sections which feed into a feed-back path also belong to the
persistent cross section. Both sections are highlighted with the dashed
box. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

Simplified schematic representation of a 4-bit accumulate adder implemented in an FPGA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

Simplified schematic representation of a 4-bit accumulate adder implemented in an FPGA. The bit stored at address 0x3 in the LUT second
from the top was flipped from a 0 to a 1 by an SEU. . . . . . . . . . .

42

xiv

5.8

Comparison of resource utilization, dynamic cross section and persistent
cross section for a Counter Array design. The diagram on the left is a
screen capture of the resource layout of the design. The right and left
diagrams are respectively the dynamic and persistent cross section of the
Counter Array design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

Comparison of resource utilization, dynamic cross section and persistent
cross section for a Synthetic design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47

Comparison of resource utilization, dynamic cross section and persistent
cross section for the DSP Kernel design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47

The diagram on the left represents a temporary service interruption, or
non-persistent errors. The diagram on the right depicts a permanent
service interruption, or persistent errors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

Comparison of the DSP Kernel design’s persistent cross section before
and after partial mitigation with TMR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

Plot of device utilization vs. MTBF for the DSP Kernel and Synthetic
designs in a Low-Earth Orbit at Solar Max. Both applications are assumed to be non-persistent-error-tolerant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

A.1

A feed-forward multiplier circuit [4]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

A.2

A feed-forward multiplier circuit [4]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

A.3

A synthetic FPGA design with LFSRs and a multiplier-adder tree [4]. .

78

A.4

A digital signal processing kernel design developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory [4]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

78

B.1

Van Allen trapped radiation belts around the earth [2]. . . . . . . . . .

80

B.2

Motion of trapped particles in the Van Allen radiation belts [5]. . . . .

80

B.3

Integral trapped proton LET spectrum for a low-earth orbit at 560 km
altitude and 35.0o degrees inclination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

B.4

The earth’s magnetosphere [2]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

82

B.5

Integral heavy-ion LET spectrum for a low-earth orbit at 560 km altitude
and 35.0o degrees inclination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

5.9

5.10

5.11

6.1

6.2

xv

C.1

The SLAAC1-V configurable computing platform. . . . . . . . . . . . .

86

C.2

Fault-injection test time-line: Sequence of events in a single trial to test
a configuration bit for persistence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

Proton irradiation test time-line: Sequence of events in a single trial to
test a configuration bit for persistence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

89

Block diagram of the SLAAC1v configurable computing PCI board. The
SLAAC1V has three Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGAs. . . . . . . . . . .

92

Timeline of events in the fault-injection tool to test a configuration bit
for persistence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

Flow diagram of the Output Error thread in the data collection software
for accelerator persistence tests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95

Flow diagram of the Bitstream Fault thread in the data collection software for accelerator persistence tests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

96

UML diagram of the software classes used to represent the data structure
of events parsed from the data recorded at an accelerator using the data
collection software. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98

D.6

Sample output error (OE) data log. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

D.7

Sample read-back error (RB) data log. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

D.8

Flow diagram of the algorithm to classify sensitive configuration bit data
collected at an accelerator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

D.9

Example timeline of events recorded at an accelerator. . . . . . . . . . . 102

C.3

D.1

D.2

D.3

D.4

D.5

D.10 Histogram of the delta time in ms between an output error event and an
configuration upset event. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
D.11 Flow diagram of an algorithm to classify persistent configuration bit data
collected at an accelerator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
D.12 Example timeline of events recorded at an accelerator. . . . . . . . . . . 105
D.13 Flow diagram of an algorithm to classify persistent configuration bit data
collected at an accelerator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

xvi

D.14 Example timeline of events recorded at an accelerator. . . . . . . . . . . 107

xvii

Chapter 1

Introduction

Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) have become an attractive computing solution for space-destined systems. Recent government and military space-based
systems have exploited FPGAs. Writer Kevin Morris reported that 76 Actel FPGAs
were either on or orbiting mars in 2004. He also reported that Xilinx FPGAs are
used in some of the control systems for the high-profile mars rover missions [6].
The increased usage of FPGAs in space can be attributed to the many benefits they provide. FPGAs have high-performance capabilities. The programmable
logic and on-chip memories are well-suited to complex high-throughput applications,
particularly those used in signal processing. FPGAs’ are also very flexible. Their ondemand reconfiguration capability supports the use of multiple applications on the
same chip through time multiplexing. In addition, new applications can be ’uploaded’
on-mission and existing applications can be ’fixed’ if bugs are found or modifications
are desired.
Although FPGAs benefit a space system in many ways, the outer space environment poses difficult reliable operation challenges, particularly for FPGAs. The
radiation prevalent in space can upset values in the on-chip memories or flip-flops
(used by an application to store dynamic data). These incorrect values can manifest
as functional errors if they propagate to the chip’s output pins. The space radiation
can also upset the configuration memory (used to statically store an application’s
configuration), which can actually modify the configured application. In this case,
the corrupted circuit can generate invalid values which will be latched in the on-chip
memories or flip-flops. Again, these incorrect values can manifest as functional errors
1

if they propagate to the chip’s output pins. Unfixed, the configuration memory can
indefinitely induce functional errors and could permanently interrupt an application’s
proper operation without external intervention.
As a result of the reliable operation challenges, reliability-constrained FPGA
applications must mitigate some measure of functional errors in order to qualify for
space. Typical strategies immunize an FPGA application against radiation-induced
functional errors by adding redundant copies of all circuit resources and continuously
monitoring for and correcting upsets in the configuration memory. The redundancy
ensures that no single upset will manifest as a functional error at the chip’s output
pins. Monitoring and correcting the configuration memory ensures that, for the most
part, no more than a single upset exists at any given time.
Unfortunately space-destined systems also often have other design constraints
which make complete functional error mitigation infeasible. A system’s set of design
constraints typically include reliability, availability and cost (area, resources, power
etc.). In some cases a system is limited by just one of these three constraints. In
other cases a system is limited by a combination of these three constraints or even
others. An important combination of constraints for space-destined FPGA applications is reliability and resource count. A completely mitigated implementation of an
application may meet reliability constraints, but often exceeds the number of available resources in the FPGA. For these scenarios other solutions are necessary that
use fewer resources, but still provide acceptable reliability.
This thesis will introduce a novel mitigation technique that provides acceptable
reliability at lower resource costs by giving up availability. To support this technique
a system must be able to tolerate temporary interruptions of service. In an FPGA,
dynamic functional errors are the interruptions of service. This thesis will show that
dynamic functional errors can be divided into two categories based on duration of service interruption. Non-persistent functional errors temporarily interrupt application
service. Persistent functional errors permanently interrupt application service until
reset. A system which can tolerate non-persistent functional errors only needs to
mitigate persistent functional errors. Since persistent functional errors represent only
2

a subset of all functional errors mitigating them requires fewer redundant resources.
Furthermore, mitigating only persistent functional errors reserves valuable redundant
resources for mitigating the cause of real application failures. As such, reliability can
be improved with far fewer resources.
To quantify the relative reliability improvements presented in this work, onorbit application failure rates will be presented throughout this thesis for four benchmark applications. Rates will be computed for each of the four applications in three
distinct orbits.
1.1

Benchmark Designs
The first benchmark application consists of an array of feed-forward multipliers

with no internal state. This circuit represents a typical data-flow application. The
second is a large array of 400 8-bit counters (each containing count state). This circuit
represents an application with significant amounts of internal state. The third is a
synthetic application consisting of LFSRs and a multiplier-adder tree. This circuit
represents the typical mixture of data-flow and internal state in an application. The
fourth is a Digital Signal Processing (DSP) kernel developed at Los Alamos National
Laboratory. This circuit represents a real application. More information about each
application, including size and functionality, can be found in Appendix A.
1.2

Orbits
The first orbit is a typical Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) at 560 km altitude and

35.0o inclination. The second is a Polar orbit at 833 km altitude and 98.7o inclination.
This orbit helps demonstrate the increased failure rates seen at the earth’s magnetic
poles. The final is the Global Positioning System (GPS) orbit at 22, 200 km and 55.0o
inclination. This orbit is outside the natural shielding of the earth’s magnetosphere.
Such an orbit also leads to increased failure rates.
1.3

Organization
The organization of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the space

radiation environment and FPGA radiation effects. Chapter 3 reviews operational
3

(dynamic) functional errors in an FPGA. Chapter 4 introduces non-persistent and
persistent functional errors. Chapter 5 presents the non-persistent and persistent
cross sections, in other words, a mapping from both non-persistent and persistent
functional errors to circuit elements. Chapter 6 shows how these mappings can be
exploited to mitigate just persistent functional errors. This method can deliver acceptable levels of reliability within other design constraints, often at much lower costs
than full functional error mitigation.
As FPGAs are used more and more in space-based systems for their performance and flexibility, FPGA reliability improvement techniques will become more and
more essential. The technique presented in this thesis is just one of the many possible
methods. It offers one more option or design point in the space of possible reliability
enhancement solutions. Systems which can afford to give up some availability can
use this technique to improve reliability at lower resource costs.

4

Chapter 2

Radiation Effects and FPGAs

Developing a method for cost-effective FPGA functional error mitigation requires estimating failure rates for a specific FPGA application. The first step to determine an FPGA application’s failure rate is to quantitatively determine the FPGA’s
sensitivity to radiation. The next step is to determine the radiation flux specific to
the FPGA’s destined orbit. Based on these two values, static upset rates can be calculated. In later chapters, these rates will be used to predict upset rates for applications
before and after functional error mitigation.
This chapter reviews the space radiation environment and generic and FPGAspecific radiation effects. The chapter concludes with a quantitative analysis of orbitspecific upset rates for a specific FPGA in the three orbits described in Section 1.2.
Although the results presented are not direct estimates of failure rate for a specific
application, they are necessary to compute an application’s failure rate. Each of the
subsequent chapters (excluding Chapters 4 and 7) will present failure rates based on
the values presented in this chapter.
2.1

Space Radiation Environment
Several particle sources contribute to the composition of the space radiation

environment. One source, a region known as the Van Allen belts, extends from 800
kilometers above the earth out to 6 earth radii and beyond. This region, depicted in
Figure 2.1, mostly consists of trapped electrons and protons. The earth’s magnetic
field suspends the particles in orbit at a relatively fixed distance. Protons and elec-
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trons with energies up to 10 M eV (millionelectronvolts) and several hundred MeV
respectively reside in the belts.

Figure 2.1: Van Allen trapped radiation belts around the earth [2].

The sun also contributes to the radiation environment in space. It periodically
ejects intense quantities of energetic particles into space via cosmic rays. Particles
in cosmic rays have energies up to several thousand MeV. The earth’s magnetic field
deflects a majority of these particles. As a result, the particle flux at a given point
in space is a function of the earth’s magnetic field strength at that location. Peak
particle fluxes typically exist at higher altitudes and near the earth’s magnetic poles.
In addition to particles from the sun, cosmic rays of unknown origin contribute
to particle flux, particularly at high altitudes and near the earth’s magnetic poles.
Galactic Cosmic Rays (GCR), as they are called, typically consist of about 85 percent
protons, about 14 percent alpha particles and about 1 percent heavier nuclei [5].
Particles with energy up to the GeV range exist in GCRs. More information about
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the temporal and spatial composition of the space radiation environment can be found
in Appendix B.
2.2

Single Event Effects
Energetic particles in space, trapped in the Van Allen belts or transmitted

by cosmic rays, can deposit unwanted charge in a microelectronic device. Excess
charge can cause transient faults or even permanent damage. Figure 2.2 lists the
different types of transient and permanent faults, commonly called soft and hard
errors respectively. The set of all soft and hard errors are known as Single Event
Effects (SEE). Note that a single particle causes each of the different SEE fault types.
Other time-integrated effects also occur as the result of total radiation dose.

Figure 2.2: The different classes of soft and hard errors collectively known as Single
Event Effects [3].

This work focuses on the effects of a subset of soft errors known as Single
Event Upsets (SEU). An SEU occurs when deposited charge directly causes a change
of state in a dynamic circuit memory element (flip-flop, latch, etc.). The change in
state of one node is a single bit upset (SBU). The change in state of more than one
node is a multiple bit upset (MBU). Both types of SEUs cause faults which can be
repaired dynamically or by a power off/on.
7

2.3

Static SEU Cross Section
The total fraction of a device sensitive to SEUs is often referred to as its static

SEU cross section (measured in units of cm2 ) [7]. A device’s static SEU cross section
is a function of the sensitive volume at each node. A single node’s sensitive volume
corresponds to the amount of charge that must be collected (in the node) from an
external charge deposition to change its state. The static SEU cross section of an
entire device is proportional to the sum of the sensitive volumes of all nodes.
Since different particle energies deposit different amounts of charge, a node’s
SEU susceptibility varies with particle energy. E.L. Petersen et al. at the Naval
Research Laboratory proposed that per-bit static cross section vs. energy follows a
Weibull distribution [8]. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 depict the Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA
proton and heavy-ion per-bit cross sections respectively, fit to a Weibull distribution.
In both figures, the x axis is energy and the y axis is per-bit cross section. The
formula for a heavy-ion Weibull distribution is,
s

F (L) = σsat (1 − e−[(L−Lo )/W ] ),

(2.1)

where,
F (L) = Heavy Ion SEU cross section in µ2 /bit,
σsat = limiting or plateau cross section in µ2 ,
L = effective LET (linear energy transfer) in M eV − cm2 /mg,
Lo = upset threshold LET in M eV − cm2 /mg,
W = dimensionless width parameter,
and
s = dimensionless exponent parameter.
The formula for a proton Weibull distribution is,
s

F (x) = σsat (1 − e−[(x−xo )/W ] ),
where,
F (x) = Proton SEU cross section in cm2 /bit,
8

(2.2)

σsat = limiting or plateau cross section in cm2 ,
x = proton energy in M eV ,
xo = onset energy in M eV ,
W = dimensionless width parameter,
and
s = dimensionless exponent parameter.
These formulas and the specific parameter values for the Xilinx XCV100 can be found
in [9]. The figures show that at higher energies, the per-bit cross section or node
sensitivity goes up. However, above a particular energy the size of the cross section
plateaus or saturates. Total device cross section estimates, such as that shown in
Table 2.1 for the XCV1000, often assume worst-case, or saturation cross section for
each bit.

Figure 2.3: Proton SEU configuration latch per-bit cross sections for the XCV1000
FPGA fit to the Weibull distribution.
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Figure 2.4: Heavy ion SEU configuration latch per-bit cross sections for the XCV1000
FPGA fit to the Weibull distribution.

2.4

FPGA Static SEU Cross Section
The signature of a device’s per-bit Weibull cross section varies based on the

physical characteristics of its sensitive nodes. In an FPGA, sensitive nodes include
configuration memory cells, user flip-flops and user memory cells. Figure 2.5 represents the architecture of a simplified FPGA logic block. Latch cells hold the configuration of the look-up tables (LUT), inter-block routing (not shown in the figure) and
other miscellaneous configurable logic. Other memory element architectures are used
for the flip-flops and user memories. The sensitive volume characteristics of the configuration cells, flip-flops and user memories dictate the shape of the Weibull per-bit
cross section distribution.
Table 2.1 enumerates the total SEU cross section of a Xilinx XCV1000 FPGA
as well as the per-bit cross section for each type of sensitive node. The sum of the
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Figure 2.5: A simplified schematic representation of one configurable logic block in
an FPGA.

number of each node type multiplied by its respective per-bit cross section equals
the total static cross section. This particular device has approximately 5.8 × 106
configuration latches and 24 × 103 user flip-flops. The user flip-flops have a larger
per bit cross section, but have a less significant impact on total cross section due to
the smaller number of flip-flop nodes. The configuration memory cells comprise more
than 95% of the total cross section. As is the case with most RAM-based FPGAs,
the configuration memory dominates the static cross section.

Table 2.1: Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA Static SEU Proton Saturation Cross
Section[1]
Cross
Section
(cm2 /bit)
Config. Latch 2.2 × 10−14
Flip-Flop
1.8 × 10−14
Block-RAM 4.4 × 10−14
POR
1.8 × 10−14
Total
Circuit
Resource

Number
on
Chip
5.8 × 106
2.4 × 104
1.3 × 105
43
-
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Cross Section
(cm2 )

% of Total
Cross Section

1.3 × 10−7
4.3 × 10−10
5.7 × 10−9
7.7 × 10−13
1.36 × 10−7

95.5%
0.3%
4.2%
0.0%
100%

Like SRAM memory, an FPGA’s total static cross section scales with the
size of the device (i.e. number of bits or nodes). Table 2.2 lists the proton static
cross section for several FPGAs. Notice that the per-bit cross section is constant
for a particular device family, but the total device static cross section scales with
the number of bits. Consequently, smaller FPGAs have a smaller static cross section
while larger FPGAs have a larger static cross section.

Table 2.2: Proton Static Cross Section Measurements for the Configuration Memory
of a Set of Xilinx FPGAs
# Configuration
Bits
Virtex 300
1.6 × 106
Virtex 600
3.1 × 106
Virtex 1000
5.8 × 106
Virtex II 1000
2.8 × 106
Virtex II 3000
7.3 × 106
Virtex II 6000
1.6 × 107
Device

2.5

Proton Static Cross Section (cm2 )
per-bit
total
2.2 × 10−14
3.5 × 10−8
2.2 × 10−14
6.9 × 10−8
2.2 × 10−14
1.3 × 10−7
−14
3.8 × 10
1.1 × 10−7
3.8 × 10−14
2.8 × 10−7
3.8 × 10−14
6.2 × 10−7

Orbit Specific Static SEU Rates
Predicting the frequency of radiation-induced faults in a given device requires

knowledge about device’s static cross section and destined environment. Methods exist to calculate upset rates based an orbit’s estimated energy spectrum and a device’s
sensitive cross section characteristics described by a Weibull distribution [8, 10, 3, 7].
Readily available computer codes aid in automatic calculation of upset rates.
Static SEU rates for a Xilinx XCV1000 FPGA in several orbits are listed in
Table 2.3. Appendix E completely documents the software and parameters used to
generate the rates found in this table. The results shows that during Solar Minimum1
conditions in the example low-earth orbit (LEO), the configuration memory will experience approximately 2.8 configuration upsets every one-hundred hours and roughly
1

See Appendix B for more information on solar conditions.
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1.9 configuration upsets per one-hundred hours during “solar flare” conditions. In
a global positioning system (GPS) orbit, approximately 4.5 configuration memory
configuration upsets will occur every one-hundred hours during Solar Minimum and
approximately 13 configuration upsets will occur per one hour during flare conditions.
In contrast, Xilinx Corporation estimates that the XCV1000 will statically experience
one upset every 2.2 × 106 hours when operating at sea level [11].
The astute reader will notice that in some situations the Solar Maximum SEU
rates are actually smaller than the Solar Minimum SEU rates. During Solar Maximum, increased solar activity increases the particle flux outside the magnetosphere.
At altitudes below the magnetosphere, however, the magnetic field shields a large
portion of the solar particles thus the trapped particle flux dominates even during
increased solar activity.

Table 2.3: Static SEU Rate Forecast for a Single Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA in
Several Different Orbits

2.6

Orbit

Alt.
(km)

Incl.
(deg)

LEO
Polar
GPS

560
833
22, 200

35.0o
98.7o
55.0o

Solar
Minimum
(SEU/hr)
2.8 × 10−2
6.9 × 10−2
4.5 × 10−2

Solar
Maximum
(SEU/hr)
1.8 × 10−2
5.5 × 10−2
4.6 × 10−1

Worst
Week
(SEU/hr)
1.9 × 10−2
1.1
3.7

Worst
Day
(SEU/hr)
1.9 × 10−2
3.8
1.3 × 10+1

Summary
This chapter introduced the space radiation environment and FPGA radiation

effects. The static SEU cross section of an FPGA was also defined. Radiation environment models and static cross section measurements for a Xilinx XCV1000 FPGA
were used to calculate static on-orbit upset rates in three benchmark orbits. These
upset rates, presented in Table 2.3, do not represent failure rates for any particular
FPGA application. The following chapter will show that application failure rate depends on other factors in addition to static SEU rates. All failure rates presented
13

throughout this thesis are based on the static cross section numbers reported in Table 2.3. Each of the subsequent chapters (excluding Chapters 4 and 7) will present
failure rates based on the values presented in this chapter. These failure rates will
be used to prove that the mitigation technique introduced in this thesis provides
acceptable reliability at lower resource costs by giving up availability.
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Chapter 3

Dynamic Cross Section

The previous chapter described the space radiation environment, introduced
the concept of single event effects and showed that a device’s sensitivity to single
event effects can be measured as a static cross section. However, any unique FPGA
configuration (user circuit design) does not typically utilize an entire device. Research
at Brigham Young University demonstrated that an SEU in an unutilized FPGA
resource typically does not affect a circuit’s proper operation. Consequently, FPGAs
have an operational (dynamic) cross section usually much smaller than their total
static cross section [12, 13, 14].
When programmed with a user circuit design, an FPGA’s configuration memory has a unique dynamic cross section. FPGA dynamic cross section is the fraction
of an FPGA’s static cross section sensitive to SEUs. A design’s utilization of programmable routing, logic, and I/O resources determines its dynamic cross section.
Specifically, nodes which generate functional errors when upset belong to a design’s
dynamic cross section. Since a design never uses all of an FPGA’s resources, the
dynamic cross section is generally much smaller than the static cross section.
Since dynamic cross section properly accounts for a circuit’s actual resource
utilization, it should be used to more accurately estimate an application’s failure rate.
Such failure rate estimates are calculated by simply scaling static SEU rate by the
size of an application’s dynamic cross section. Calculating failure rate in this manner
leads to more accurate estimates.
This chapter begins with a description of dynamic functional errors and the
methodology used to measure dynamic cross section. Next, measurements of dynamic
15

cross section for a few sample applications are presented. Finally, estimated failure
rates for these applications are reported showing how to more accurately calculate an
application’s failure rate based on its dynamic cross section.
3.1

Dynamic Single Event Upsets in FPGAs
An FPGA resource utilized by a specific design and corrupted by an SEU

in the configuration memory may generate functional errors. Figures 3.1 and 3.2
illustrate how an SEU alters an FPGA design and induces functional errors. Figure 3.1
depicts a simplified programmable logic block, the standard programmable unit in
an FPGA. The two 4-input function generators (i.e. Look-Up Tables (LUT)) store
their configuration in 16x1 memories. In the figure, the top LUT’s configuration
implements a logical 2-input OR function. Since only 2 inputs are used, 3/4 of the
LUT’s contents don’t matter. The bottom LUT is not configured so none of the
contents in this LUT matter. Figure 3.2 depicts the same logic block after a particle
strike and subsequent single bit upset (SBU) at address 0x3 in the top LUT. In this
case, the upset modified the LUT so that it now performs a 2-input logical XOR
function. Until the upset bit is restored to its proper configuration, the LUT will
execute the logical XOR function and can produce functional errors. In this example,
the affected configuration bit belongs to the dynamic cross section.
In the preceding example a particle strike and subsequent SEU in the bottom
LUT would not have adversely altered the programmed application. The unutilized LUT’s configuration memory is loaded with “don’t care” values. These unprogrammed configuration bits belong to the non-dynamic cross section. An upset in
this LUT would change the configured logic function, but would not cause functional
errors during operation. Since only utilized resources affect a design’s proper operation, only a subset of all configuration bits belong to the dynamic cross section.
Therefore, dynamic cross section is smaller than an FPGA’s static cross section.
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Figure 3.1: Representation of an FPGA configurable logic block. The top half of the
block is programmed to perform a 2-input logical OR function. The output of this
function is latched in a user flip-flop. The bottom half of the block is not configured.

Figure 3.2: Representation of a configured FPGA logic block upset by an SEU. In
this case, the particle strike corrupted the top LUT so that its function switched to
a 2-input logical XOR.

3.2

Measuring Dynamic Cross Section
Two techniques aid in estimating and measuring dynamic cross section. Fault-

injection predicts or estimates a design’s dynamic cross section. Particle irradiation
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more formally measures dynamic cross section and validates fault-injection predictions.
Analytical techniques such as fault-injection estimates dynamic cross section
size by injecting faults into an FPGA’s configuration bitstream and simultaneously
monitoring the FPGA’s outputs for functional errors. Configuration memory locations which induce functional errors when upset belong to the dynamic cross section.
A fault-injection tool developed by Eric Johnson at Brigham Young University accurately estimates dynamic cross section [15]. This tool estimates dynamic
cross section for a given FPGA design by artificially upsetting individual bits within
the configuration memory of an FPGA device under test (DUT). The tool identifies “sensitive” configuration bits, or bits which belong to the dynamic cross section.
Johnson’s tool can rapidly test all configuration bits in a bitstream to create an accurate and complete characterization of the dynamic cross section of a given FPGA
design. With Johnson’s tool, the entire 5.8 × 106 bit configuration memory of a Xilinx
Virtex XCV1000 can be tested in approximately 20 minutes [12].
The predicted size of a design’s dynamic cross section, xdp , is equal to the
fraction of “sensitive” configuration bits identified in the design, multiplied by the
device’s measured static cross section
xdp = xs ×

# sensitive bits
,
# total bits

(3.1)

where,
xdp = predicted dynamic cross section,
and
xs = measured static device cross section.
Since static cross section has units of cm2 and the ratio of sensitive to total bits is
unit-less, the result has units of cm2 .
To validate fault injection estimates, more formal measurements of dynamic
cross section are taken using proton testing. Measured dynamic cross section, xdm , is
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the ratio of functional errors to particle fluence, or mathematically,
xdm =

# error events
,
fluence × cos θ

(3.2)

where,
xdm = measured dynamic cross section,
and
θ = incident particle angle [7, 16].
The particle fluence is scaled by the cosine of the incident particle angle to account
for variance in fluence due to angle of incidence. Since fluence has units of (#/cm2 )
and functional errors has units of (#), the result has units of cm2 .
3.3

Dynamic Cross Section Measurements
Fault-injection and proton irradiation were used to estimate the dynamic cross

section for the four benchmark FPGA designs introduced in Section 1.1. Johnson’s
fault-injection tool was used for estimates and the 63 MeV proton source at Crocker
Nuclear Laboratory in Davis, CA, was used for formal measurements. Table 3.1
reports the predicted and measured size of dynamic cross section for each of the
tested applications. The parameters necessary to compute dynamic cross section with
Equations 3.1 and 3.2 are also reported. The results show that fault-injection is at
least as good as an order-of-magnitude estimate of measured cross section. Previous
research by Johnson et al. showed their fault-injection tool to be accurate to within
1% [12]. Known differences between the two testing methodologies account for the
error. More information about the correlation of estimated and measured dynamic
cross section results can be found in Johnson’s thesis [4].

The signature of a design’s dynamic cross section correlates to the mapping
and routing of resources the design utilizes. To show this correlation, graphical representations of resource utilization and dynamic cross section for the Counter, Synthetic
and DSP Kernel designs are depicted in Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 respectively. In each
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Table 3.1: Dynamic Cross Section Predictions and Measurements†
Predicted
Design
sensitive
size
bits (#)
(cm2 )
Multiplier
516,494 1.1 × 10−8
Counter
192,717 4.2 × 10−9
Synthetic
179,384 4.0 × 10−9
DSP Kernel 502,082 1.1 × 10−8

Measured
fluence
θ
( #particles
)
(deg)
cm2
7.2 × 1010
0o
2.4 × 1011
0o
11
2.7 × 10
0o
3.1 × 1011
0o

events
(#)
597
833
862
2,737

size
(cm2 )
8.3 × 10−9
3.5 × 10−9
3.2−9
8.9 × 10−9

%
error††
−32.5%
−20.0%
−31.3%
−15.8%

†The device used in testing was a 0.22µm 5-layer epitaxial process Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA
with a static cross section of 1.28 × 10−7 cm2 [1].
††
%error = (measured − predicted)/measured

figure, the left graphic is a screen capture of the design’s utilization from the resource editor tool, fpga editor, provided by the manufacturer. The right graphic is
a Matlab rendering of the design’s dynamic cross section as determined by Johnson’s
fault-injection tool. The marked points indicate “sensitive” configuration memory
bits, according to the physical layout. In other words, marked points indicate a bit
which caused functional errors when upset. In both circuits, the location of sensitive
bits correlates with device resource utilization.

Counter Array

FPGA Layout

Dynamic Cross Section

Figure 3.3: Comparison of the resource utilization and dynamic cross section for a
Counter Array design. The diagram on the left is a screen capture of the resource
layout of the design. The right diagram is a graphical representation of the portion
of the Counter Array design layout which constitutes its dynamic cross section.
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Synthetic Design

FPGA Layout

Dynamic Cross Section

Figure 3.4: Comparison of resource utilization and dynamic cross section for the
Synthetic design.

DSP Kernel Design

FPGA Layout

Dynamic Cross Section

Figure 3.5: Comparison of resource utilization and dynamic cross section for the DSP
Kernel design.

Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 allude to the large disparity between the size of static
and dynamic cross section. Figure 3.6 illustrates this disparity. The figure depicts the
relative size of the static cross section of a Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA compared
to the dynamic cross section of the four designs listed in Table 3.1. In all cases, the
dynamic cross section is at least one order of magnitude smaller than the static cross
section.
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of the relative size of the dynamic to static cross section for
several designs.

3.4

MTBF Estimation
Measuring dynamic cross section ultimately leads to more accurate predic-

tions of a design’s reliability performance in a specific environment. Failure rate or
it’s inverse, Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF), are two metrics which measure reliability performance in a real system. Failure rate is the rate per unit time of critical
service interruptions in a system. MTBF is the inverse of failure rate or average time
between critical interruptions of service. This section explains how to calculate these
two quantities and presents MTBF numbers for a few sample applications.
3.4.1

Calculating MTBF
In an FPGA, an application’s on-orbit dynamic failure rate λd is calculated as

the ratio of its dynamic cross section to the FPGA’s static cross section, multiplied
by the FPGA’s static SEU rate in the specified orbit, or mathematically,
λd =

Dynamic Cross Section
× Static SEU Rate.
Static Cross Section

(3.3)

In other words, the fraction of SEUs which cause design failures is directly proportional to the design’s particular sensitive subset of the FPGA’s static cross section.
Since the ratio of cross sections in Equation 3.3 is unit-less, failure rate has the same
units as static SEU rate, or events per unit time.
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Dynamic mean time between failure, M T BFd , is simply the inverse of dynamic
failure rate. Stated mathematically, the dynamic MTBF is
M T BFd =

1
.
λd

(3.4)

As such, M T BFd has inverse units of λd , or time per failure.
3.4.2

Orbit-Specific MTBF Estimates
Table 3.2 reports MTBF estimates for each application listed in Table 3.1 and

introduced in Chapter 1. The MTBF values presented here were calculated using
Equations 3.3 and 3.4. For each orbit, the static SEU rate parameter in Equation 3.3
comes from Table 2.3. All numbers assume the specified design is configured into a
single Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA.
According to Table 3.2, the Multiplier application will fail once every 410
hours during Solar Minimum1 conditions in the specified Low-Earth orbit. On the
other hand, during the Worst Day1 solar conditions in the GPS orbit, the Multiplier
application will fail once every .85 hours, or approximately once every 51 minutes.
This result is consistent with characteristics of the GPS orbit’s intense radiation
environment. Since a design experiences a higher particle flux in the GPS orbit, it
will fail more often.
Table 3.2 also reveals that, in all orbits, the Counter design will fail approximately three times less often than the Multiplier circuit. This results is consistent
with the cross section measurements found in Table 3.1. The Multiplier has a dynamic cross section of 1.1 × 10−8 cm2 , while the Counter’s dynamic cross section is
approximately three times smaller at 4.2 × 10−9 cm2 . As a result, the Counter design
will always fail approximately three times less often than the Multiplier design when
operating in equivalent radiation conditions.

3.5

Summary
Only utilized resources in an FPGA induce dynamic functional errors when

upset. As a result, the fraction of an FPGA sensitive to an SEU is application
1

See Appendix B for more information on solar conditions.
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Table 3.2: On-Orbit Mean Time Between Failure Estimates
Design

Multiplier

Counter

Synthetic

DSP Kernel

Solar
Conditions
Solar Min
Solar Max
Worst Day
Solar Min
Solar Max
Worst Day
Solar Min
Solar Max
Worst Day
Solar Min
Solar Max
Worst Day

Mean Time Between Failure
(hours)
†
LEO
Polar††
GPS†††
2
2
4.1 × 10 1.6 × 10
2.5 × 102
6.1 × 102 2.1 × 102 2.4 × 102
5.6 × 102
3.0
8.5 × 10−1
3
2
1.1 × 10 4.3 × 10
6.7 × 102
1.6 × 103 5.5 × 102 6.5 × 102
1.5 × 103
8.0
2.3
1.2 × 103 4.7 × 102 7.2 × 102
1.8 × 103 5.9 × 102 7.0 × 102
1.6 × 103
8.6
2.4
4.2 × 102 1.7 × 102 2.6 × 102
6.3 × 102 2.1 × 102 2.5 × 102
5.7 × 102
3.1
8.7 × 10−1

†

Low-Earth Orbit at 560 km altitude, 35.0o inclination
Polar Orbit at 833 km altitude, 98.7o inclination
†††
Global Positioning System Orbit at 22, 200 km altitude, 55.0o inclination
††

specific. This fraction or dynamic cross section can be predicted with fault-injection
or measured with particle irradiation. Using dynamic cross section to estimate FPGA
application failure rates yields less pessimistic estimates than using static cross section
because dynamic cross section accounts for the unused portions of an FPGA. Dynamic
cross section was measured for four benchmark applications. The results were used
to estimate failure rates for these applications in three orbits.

24

Chapter 4

Persistent Functional Errors

As explained in Chapter 3, failure rate predictions should use dynamic cross
section since dynamic cross section accounts for the resource utilization of a particular
application. However, this prediction methodology ignores the possibility of different
functional error modes. It treats all dynamic functional errors equally. This thesis
will show that dynamic functional errors can actually be divided into two distinct
categories, non-persistent and persistent. Each error mode uniquely affects a system’s operation. As a result, failure rate estimates should account for both types.
Furthermore, a later chapter will show that sophisticated SEU mitigation strategies
can exploit non-persistent functional errors to improve reliability at lower costs.
This chapter begins with a review of related research in error mode classification. Next, the chapter reviews configuration memory scrubbing. Scrubbing makes
redundancy-based functional error mitigation schemes possible in an FPGA. Furthermore, scrubbing makes the distinction between non-persistent and persistent error
modes possible. Next, non-persistent and persistent functional errors are defined.
Examples are presented to demonstrate the typical signature and side-effects of each
error type. The distinction between each error type is important for a novel functional
error mitigation methodology presented in Chapter 6.
4.1

Related Research
Classification of error modes is not a new idea. For example, researchers in [17]

and [18] proposed separating control logic errors from other errors. They termed these
control logic errors Single Event Functional Interrupts (SEFI) because a single upset
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in the control logic can render a device inoperable. Carmichael et al. also proposed
dividing FPGA functional errors into three categories: SEFIs, configuration memory
errors and user logic functional errors. Configuration memory errors occur as the
result of an upset in the user-programmable configuration memory of an FPGA. An
upset in the configuration memory can modify the programmed circuit, indirectly
causing functional errors to be latched in user memory or flip-flops. In contrast, user
logic functional errors occur as the result of an upset directly in user memory or a
user flip-flop [19].
Earl Fuller and Michael Caffrey et al. were the first to mention the concept
of different dynamic functional error modes. They suggested that some functional
errors permanently interrupt service while others only temporarily interrupt service.
Furthermore, they proposed that systems could more cost effectively improve reliability by simply tolerating temporary blocks of bad data generated by functional errors
which temporarily interrupt service [20]. The ideas presented in this thesis are built
on these concepts.
4.2

Scrubbing
Functional errors which temporarily interrupt service are only possible in an

FPGA if some form of configuration memory scrubbing is employed. In a general
sense, scrubbing is the process of repeatedly scanning for and correcting upset bits
in the configuration memory. Carl Carmichael from Xilinx Corporation suggested
two of the many various scrubbing schemes [21]. In Carmichael’s first method, an
external circuit reads the configuration memory, compares it against a golden copy,
and repairs all upset bits. The process repeats in a round-robin manner, continuously
or at pre-defined intervals. Figure 4.1 depicts a single step in one iteration of this
method. In the figure, the highlighted box represents a single frame of data read
from the configuration memory. If any of the bits in this frame do not match the
golden copy, the entire frame is rewritten. In Carmichael’s second method the entire
configuration memory is reloaded at pre-defined intervals regardless of the presence
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or absence of errors [21]. Other scrubbing schemes also exist. One popular method
speeds up the check-for-upsets step by using a checksum on each frame.

Figure 4.1: A typical scrubbing circuit reads the configuration memory one block at
a time, compares each block against a golden copy, and repairs all upset bits.

The frequency at which a system can perform scrubbing is a function of the
available hardware, the size of the memory to be scrubbed and the implemented
scrubbing method. The total time to perform one scrub ts is defined by the equation
ts = ntrd + ntck + ktrp ,

(4.1)

where trd is the time to read a single block of memory, tck is the time required to
check the contents of one block and trp is the time to repair one block of memory.
The scalar n is the number of blocks in the memory. The scalar k is the number of
blocks which require repair.
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Many factors dictate how quickly one scrub can be performed. A method
which directly checks each value takes longer than a checksum method. The size of
the constants trd , tck and trp , which depend on the speed of the scrubbing hardware
and memory, also affect the speed of scrubbing. Additionally, the size of the scalars
n and k, which depend on memory size and SEU rate, affect the average time to
complete one scrub. The scrub time ts of a real system depends on all of these factors.
For example, a checksum version of scrubbing implemented at Los Alamos National
Laboratory for a single Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA averaged 22 milliseconds.
All scrubbing methods, regardless of speed, provide two key benefits essential
to reliability enhancement. First, scrubbing prevents the buildup of multiple faults
in an FPGA’s configuration memory. Without this benefit, combinations of multiple
faults, which individually don’t cause problems, could collectively generate functional
errors. Perhaps more importantly, redundant reliability techniques, such as Triple
Modular Redundancy (TMR), which assume just a single fault at any given time,
would be ineffective. In TMR, multiple faults could eventually form a majority and
break the redundancy.
Scrubbing also provides a second important benefit. Scrubbing limits the time
a fault exists in memory. As a result, scrubbing bounds how long a given fault can
generate functional errors. An upper bound U on error generation time is given by
the equation
U = ntrd + ntck + ntrp ,

(4.2)

where the scalar n on trp indicates a worst-case scenario in which every block must
be repaired. This bound guarantees that a fault does not generate functional errors
indefinitely.
4.3

Non-Persistent Errors
Although scrubbing benefits a system’s reliability in many ways, it does not

actually mitigate functional errors. Furthermore, scrubbing does not prevent functional errors from occurring. Scrubbing only guarantees a corrupted circuit will be
repaired within a bounded time. Scrubbing does not and cannot eliminate functional
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errors since the dynamic or user logic memory elements’ contents cannot be known a
priori. To force-ably clear dynamic functional errors stored in these memory elements,
a system must apply a global reset.
Reseting an entire system to eradicate functional errors may sometimes be
overly conservative. In many cases, functional output errors that occur after an SEU
exist only temporarily. Shortly after scrubbing repairs an SEU-induced fault, the
functional errors go away and all signs of system failure vanish. These functional errors
are termed non-persistent because they do not persist in a design after configuration
scrubbing. Non-persistent functional errors only require time, not reset, to flush from
a system. The ability to tolerate temporary functional errors is system dependent.
This topic will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.4.1.
An example best demonstrates the concept of non-persistent errors. Two data
streams were collected from two identical circuits operating within the fault-injection
tool introduced in Section 3.2. The arithmetic difference between these two data
streams was computed to identify the impact of configuration upsets. Zero arithmetic
difference indicated both circuits operated correctly. A non-zero arithmetic difference
signified that one of the circuits had functional errors.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the arithmetic difference between the two circuits’ data
streams for a specific snapshot in time. The x axis is cycle count and the y axis
is the arithmetic difference between the two circuits. For the first 64 time cycles in
Figure 4.2, the difference between the two data streams was zero indicating that both
circuits operated the same. At time cycle 65 an artificial SEU flipped the value of
a configuration bit in one circuit, corrupting its configuration memory. The faulty
circuit induced functional errors and immediately the outputs of the two circuits
diverged. At time cycle 130, an artificial form of scrubbing fixed the corrupted bitstream. At this point the faulty circuit resumed proper operation and shortly thereafter the difference between the data streams returned to zero. Functional errors only
occurred from time cycle 65 to 132.
In this example, the configuration upset caused non-persistent errors, or a temporary interruption of service. A system which can tolerate non-persistent functional
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Figure 4.2: Plot of the difference between the outputs of a DUT and golden circuit
before, during and after a configuration upset. The upset generated non-persistent
functional errors.

errors does not require a global reset to restore service after non-persistent functional
errors. These systems can simply throw away the bad data and continue operating.
The exact non-persistent error signature in Figure 4.2, both in magnitude and
time, is a function of the design used as well as the upset bit and set of input vectors.
In a general sense, however, the error signature represents the typical temporal characteristics of non-persistent functional errors. The arithmetic difference between the
outputs of a DUT and golden circuit always return to zero after scrubbing. In other
words, a circuit will resume proper operation with proper output data after scrubbing
repairs a fault that induced only non-persistent errors.
4.4

Persistent Errors
Not all configuration upsets cause non-persistent errors. Although scrubbing

restores a circuit’s proper configuration, a fault can still insert incorrect functional
state into a circuit. In some cases the circuit will indefinitely propagate the incorrect
state. In this error mode the system continues to exhibit signs of system failure, or
functional errors, even after scrubbing. Permanent functional errors within a system
are termed persistent because they persist beyond repair.
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Since the duration of persistent errors is indefinite, they represent a permanent
interruption of service. Unlike non-persistent errors, persistent errors do not disappear
after configuration scrubbing. As a result, persistent errors cannot be corrected, and
will not self-correct, without a global system reset.
Figure 4.3 depicts a persistent error, or permanent service interruption. Like
the non-persistent example shown in Figure 4.2, the plot represents the arithmetic
difference between the outputs of two identical circuits over time. For the specific
time period plotted in Figure 4.3, the output stream for the two circuits matched
for the first 64 cycles. At time cycle 65 a configuration bit in one circuit was upset. Immediately the arithmetic difference became non-zero, indicating the circuits’
outputs diverged. At time cycle 130 configuration scrubbing repaired the bitstream.
Unlike the non-persistent example, the output streams in this example did not converge after scrubbing. The internal state trapped the errors and propagated them
even after scrubbing fixed the configuration bit. Since the application continued to
produce faulty data after repair, it needs a system reset to recover.

Figure 4.3: Plot of the difference between the outputs of a DUT and golden circuit before, during and after a configuration upset. The upset generated persistent
functional errors.
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Like the non-persistent error example, the exact persistent error signature in
Figure 4.3, both in magnitude and time, is a function of the design used as well as the
upset bit and set of input vectors. In a general sense, however, the error signature
represents the typical temporal characteristics of persistent functional errors. The
arithmetic difference between the outputs of a DUT and golden circuit will likely
remain non-zero indefinitely. In other words, even though a circuit will resume proper
operation after scrubbing, the circuit will continue to generate bad data as a result
of the persistent functional errors still in the system.
From the overall system perspective, persistent functional errors may look
like a Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI). A SEFI in an FPGA completely
eliminates access to its control functions such as configure, read-back, etc. An FPGA
often requires a power off/on to recover from a SEFI [3]. Persistent functional errors,
however, are specific to the configuration programmed into the FPGA, not the FPGA
itself. In addition, service can always be restored after persistent errors with a global
reset.
4.5

Summary
An upset in an FPGA application’s dynamic cross section will induce dynamic

functional errors. In an FPGA system with configuration memory scrubbing, dynamic
functional errors can be divided into two categories: non-persistent and persistent.
Non-persistent functional errors exist temporarily. After scrubbing, non-persistent
functional errors eventually disappear. The side-effect of non-persistent errors is a
temporary block of corrupted data. In contrast, persistent functional errors permanently corrupt data. Even after scrubbing, persistent functional errors do not
disappear. Most applications cannot tolerate persistent functional errors, but some
applications may be able to tolerate non-persistent functional errors. Systems which
can tolerate non-persistent errors can efficiently improve reliability by focusing error
mitigation on just persistent functional errors. The following chapters will explore
these ideas in more detail.
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Chapter 5

Persistent Cross Section

As stated in Chapter 4, an upset in the dynamic cross section results in either non-persistent or persistent functional errors. Since the two error modes are
mutually exclusive, the dynamic cross section can be divided into two components,
non-persistent and persistent. Figure 5.1 depicts the division of the dynamic cross
section into non-persistent and persistent components. A configuration upset in the
non-persistent component of the dynamic cross section results in non-persistent errors. An upset in the persistent component yields persistent errors. Systems may
realize acceptable levels of reliability, at lower costs, by focusing mitigation on just
the persistent component of a design.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: the first two sections respectively
define the non-persistent and persistent cross sections. Each section also introduces
and defines a mapping from circuit elements to the non-persistent and persistent cross
sections. The next section shows how to measure each of the cross sections. These
measurements and the mappings from circuit components to cross section are particularly important for the development and validation of a mitigation method which
focuses on just the persistent cross section. The mapping indicates specifically which
circuit elements need reliability enhancement to mitigate persistent functional errors.
Measuring the persistent cross section validates that such a mitigation scheme works.
Finally, the last section introduces the idea of tolerant and intolerant functional error
tolerance levels. In other words, this section defines what type of system can tolerate
non-persistent functional errors. Modified estimates of MTBF are reported for each
of the four benchmark applications at each tolerance level.
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Figure 5.1: The diagram on the left represents the generic relationship between static
and dynamic cross section. The diagram on the right shows the non-persistent and
persistent components of the dynamic cross section.

5.1

Non-Persistent Cross section
A design’s non-persistent cross section corresponds to circuit structures within

feed-forward paths. Since feed-forward circuits by definition do not have feed-back,
all functional errors within a feed-forward path must exit the path within a bounded
time. Furthermore, once the source of the functional errors is repaired and stops
generating errors, all functional errors in feed-forward paths, generated by that source,
will disappear within a finite time.
Like the dynamic cross section, the size and exact footprint of the non-persistent
and persistent cross sections are design dependent. The size of a design’s nonpersistent cross section is proportional to the number of resources and routing connections utilized in all feed-forward sections of the design. The exact footprint of
a design’s non-persistent cross section correlates to the mapping and routing of the
feed-forward resources.
Figure 5.2 depicts a generic circuit with both non-persistent and persistent
components. The non-persistent components are highlighted with the dashed line.
The first four elements along the bottom path (two logic stages and two flip-flops) in
addition to the final set of logic and flip-flop at the output belong to the non-persistent
cross section. In this feed-forward path, an SEU-induced fault would generate functional errors and feed them downstream (to the right). As a result, once scrubbing
repairs the configuration fault, all previously generated functional errors will eventually flush from the path.
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Figure 5.2: The feed-forward sections of a circuit, outlined with the dashed line,
belong to the non-persistent cross section.

A specific example best demonstrates which parts of a circuit belong to the
non-persistent cross section. A simple 4-bit full-adder has only a non-persistent cross
section. Figure 5.3 depicts a simplified schematic of a 4-bit adder implemented in
an FPGA. The implementation requires four LUTs, four XOR gates, four muxes and
four flip-flops. The circuit computes the 4-bit sum s of two 4-bit operands, a and
b. Table 5.1 depicts a sequence of inputs to this circuit. The table also lists the
corresponding sequence of actual and desired outputs. For the first two cycles, the
actual output and the desired output matched. During cycle three, an SEU flipped
the bit stored at address 0x3 in the LUT second from the top (see Figure 5.4). As
a result, the output on cycle three did not match the desired output. This faulty
data represents a functional error. On the next cycle, bits a2 and b2 did not exercise
the corrupted location in the affected LUT, so the actual and desired outputs again
agreed. On cycle five, the operands exercised the corrupted location, resulting in
invalid output. Finally, at the beginning of cycle six, scrubbing repaired the corrupted
LUT value. The actual and desired outputs for cycles six through eight matched.
In the preceding 4-bit adder example, the circuit is completely feed-forward.
As a result, functional errors are stored in the sum flip-flops for one cycle and then
exit the circuit completely. In other words, this circuit can only generate nonpersistent functional errors. Since an SEU anywhere within this circuit only causes
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non-persistent functional errors, the entire circuit belongs to the non-persistent cross
section.

Table 5.1: Sequence of Inputs and Outputs for a 4-bit Adder Circuit
Cycle
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

5.2

input a
0b0001 (1)
0b0011 (3)
0b0110 (6)
0b1001 (9)
0b0111 (7)
0b0101 (5)
0b0110 (6)
0b1100 (12)

input
0b0001
0b1001
0b0100
0b0010
0b0110
0b0010
0b0100
0b0010

b
(1)
(9)
(4)
(2)
(6)
(2)
(4)
(2)

actual output s
0b0010 (2)
0b1100 (12)
0b0010 (2)
0b1011 (11)
0b1001 (9)
0b1110 (7)
0b1010 (10)
0b1110 (14)

desired output s
0b0010 (2)
0b1100 (12)
0b1010 (10)
0b1011 (11)
0b1101 (13)
0b1110 (7)
0b1010 (10)
0b1110 (14)

Persistent Cross section
In contrast to feed-forward circuits, an SEU within a circuit that contains

feed-back and stores internal state will cause persistent errors. The feed-back circuit
structures “trap” the incorrect state and store it until appropriate reset measures are
taken. These feed-back circuit structures belong to a design’s persistent cross section.
In addition to strictly feed-back circuits, paths which feed into a feed-back
circuit can also generate persistent functional errors. A functional error generated
in one of these paths and subsequently deposited into a feed-back circuit will be
trapped and propagated by the feed-back. As a result, circuit components in feedforward paths upstream from a feed-back circuit also belong to a design’s persistent
cross section.
Figure 5.5 depicts a generic circuit with both non-persistent and persistent
components. The persistent components are highlighted with the dashed line. Intuitively, the feedback section in the top path, consisting of logic and a register, belongs
to the persistent cross section. In addition, the first two elements in the top path
which feed into the feed-back section also belong to the persistent cross section. The
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Figure 5.3: Simplified schematic representation of a 4-bit full-adder implemented in
an FPGA.
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Figure 5.4: Simplified schematic representation of a 4-bit full-adder implemented in
an FPGA. The bit stored at address 0x3 in the LUT second from the top was flipped
from a 0 to a 1 by an SEU.

38

feed-back loop would continuously propagate functional errors generated in any stage
of the top path of this circuit until reset.

Figure 5.5: The feed-back sections of a circuit belongs to the persistent cross section.
Feed-forward sections which feed into a feed-back path also belong to the persistent
cross section. Both sections are highlighted with the dashed box.

A specific example best demonstrates what parts of a circuit belong to the
persistent cross section. A simple 4-bit accumulate adder primarily has a persistent
cross section1 . Figure 5.6 depicts a simplified schematic of a 4-bit accumulate adder
implemented in an FPGA. Note the strong similarity of this circuit to the 4-bit
adder circuit depicted in Section 5.1 as Figure 5.3. It is exactly the same circuit
with the exception of a bus which feeds the sum s back to the input as one of the
operands. This circuit computes the accumulated sum s of a series of operands a.
Table 5.2 depicts a sequence of inputs to this circuit. The table also lists the actual
and desired accumulated value after each cycle. Operand a is the next value to add
to the accumulation. Operand s is the sum from the previous iteration. The output,
or accumulated sum, after the current cycle is denoted as s0 . For the first two cycles,
the actual output and the desired accumulated output matched. During cycle three,
however, an SEU flipped the bit stored at address 0x3 in the LUT second from the
1

The routing on the output of a 4-bit accumulate adder circuit would technically belong to the
non-persistent cross section.
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top (see Figure 5.7). As a result, the accumulation on cycle three did not match
the desired output. This faulty data represents a functional error. On cycle four, the
input operands did not exercise the corrupted bit, so they are added together correctly.
However, the accumulated value still did not match the desired accumulation since the
previous sum was faulty. Even after scrubbing repaired the circuit at the beginning
of cycle six the accumulated output continued to not match the desired output. In
this case, the invalid data propagated back into the circuit indefinitely. Only a global
system reset could ensure the accumulation returned to a known value.

Table 5.2: Sequence of Inputs and Outputs for a 4-bit Adder Circuit
Cycle
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

input a
0b0001 (1)
0b0011 (3)
0b0110 (6)
0b0001 (1)
0b0010 (2)
0b0000 (0)
0b0001 (1)
0b0001 (1)

input s
0b0000 (0)
0b0001 (1)
0b0100 (4)
0b0010 (2)
0b0011 (3)
0b0101 (5)
0b0101 (5)
0b0110 (6)

actual output s’
0b0001 (1)
0b0100 (4)
0b0010 (2)
0b0011 (3)
0b0101 (5)
0b0101 (5)
0b0110 (6)
0b0111 (7)

desired output s’
0b0001 (1)
0b0100 (4)
0b1010 (10)
0b1011 (11)
0b1101 (13)
0b1101 (13)
0b1110 (14)
0b1111 (15)

In the preceding 4-bit accumulate adder example, the circuit is primarily a
feed-back loop. By definition a feed-back circuit propagates values backward. As
a result, functional errors are stored in the sum flip-flops for one cycle and then
propagated back as an operand on the next cycle. As such, functional errors never
completely exit the circuit. In other words an SEU anywhere within this circuit only
causes persistent functional errors. Consequently, almost the entire circuit belongs to
the persistent cross section.
5.3

Measuring Persistent Cross Section
Methodologies similar to those used to measure dynamic cross section were

used to also measure persistent cross section. Fault-injection was used to estimate
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Figure 5.6: Simplified schematic representation of a 4-bit accumulate adder implemented in an FPGA.

41

Figure 5.7: Simplified schematic representation of a 4-bit accumulate adder implemented in an FPGA. The bit stored at address 0x3 in the LUT second from the top
was flipped from a 0 to a 1 by an SEU.
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persistent cross section. To confirm these estimates, persistent cross section was also
measured at Crocker Nuclear Laboratory at the University of California, Davis. This
section will detail the two testing methodologies and report results from both types
of testing. Appendix C also describes these methodologies in more detail.
5.3.1

Persistent Testing Methodologies
To predict the size of a design’s persistent cross section, I modified and aug-

mented Johnson’s fault injection tool to identify bits which cause persistent functional
errors when upset. As such, the tool can now also rapidly create an accurate and
complete characterization of the persistent cross section of a given FPGA design.
In general, the fault-injection algorithm is as follows: A bit within the configuration bitstream is toggled from its correct state. The bit is left in this corrupted
state for a finite duration (corresponding to the expected scrubbing time ts ). The
corrupted bit is then restored to its original state. If errors occurred during this time,
the design is allowed to operate for an additional delta time tf to let errors flush.
If at the end of tf errors still exist, then the originally corrupted bit is classified as
contributing to persistent errors (also called a “persistent bit”). Every bit within the
FPGA’s configuration memory is tested in this manner and the results are recorded.
The size of a particular design’s predicted persistent cross section, xpp , is equal to the
fraction of “persistent bits” bits in the design multiplied by the device static cross
section. Stated mathematically, the predicted persistent cross section is
xpp = xs ×

# persistent bits
,
# total bits

(5.1)

where,
xpp = predicted persistent cross section,
and
xs = static device cross section.
Persistent cross section predictions were verified at Crocker Nuclear Laboratory in Davis, California using proton irradiation and a method very similar to
measuring dynamic cross section. A 63 MeV proton source caused the SEUs. Since
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the inter-arrival time of the protons cannot be controlled, a different algorithm is
used to identify bits which cause persistent functional errors. Two processes operate
simultaneously on a host PC. The first process records the time and location of configuration memory upsets as reported by on-board scrubbing circuitry. The second
process records the time of all functional errors as reported by auxiliary on-board
circuitry. When a functional error occurs, the second process logs the timestamp and
then sleeps for a delta time tf to let functional errors flush. If at the end of this time
functional errors still exist, the error is marked as persistent. Post processing of data
from the two processes matches persistent errors to configuration upsets2 . The size
of the measured persistent cross section equals the number of configuration upsets
which cause persistent output errors divided by the product of the total fluence and
incident particle angle. Stated mathematically, the measured persistent cross section
is
xpm =

# persistent error events
fluence × cos θ

(5.2)

where,
xpm = measured persistent cross section,
and
θ = incident particle angle.
5.3.2

Persistent Cross Section Measurements
Both fault-injection and proton irradiation confirm that, as expected, the per-

sistent cross section does exist. Table 5.3 reports the predicted and measured size of
the persistent cross section for each of the tested applications. The parameters necessary to compute persistent cross section with Equations 5.1 and 5.2 are also reported.
The results show that fault-injection estimates are within a factor of two of actual
measured cross section. Table 5.4 repeats the predicted and measured cross section
sizes for each design along with the predicted and measured values for the design’s
corresponding dynamic cross section. The size of each design’s non-persistent cross
2

See Appendix D for more information about post processing of data.
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section is simply the difference of the persistent from the dynamic cross section. This
table shows that in all cases the persistent cross section is smaller than the dynamic
cross section.

Table 5.3: Persistent Cross Section Predictions and Measurements
Predicted
Design
persistent
size
bits (#)
(cm2 )
Multiplier
0
‡
Counter
108,750
2.5 × 10−9
Synthetic
72,991
1.7 × 10−9
DSP Kernel
8,930
2.0 × 10−10

events
(#)
0
392
324
35

Measured
fluence
θ
)
(deg)
( #particles
cm2
7.2 × 1010
0o
2.4 × 1011
0o
11
2.7 × 10
0o
3.1 × 1011
0o

size
(cm2 )
‡
1.6 × 10−9
1.2 × 10−9
1.1 × 10−10

%
error††
n/a
−56.3%
−41.7%
−81.8%

The device used in testing was a 0.22µm 5-layer epitaxial process Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA
with a static cross section of 1.28 × 10−7 cm2 [1].
‡
No events were observed.
††
%error = (measured − predicted)/measured

The signature of a design’s persistent cross section correlates to the mapping
and routing of resources in feed-back loops. This feed-back can be spread throughout
a design. To illustrate this result, graphical representations of resource utilization,
dynamic cross section and persistent cross section for the Counter, Synthetic and
DSP Kernel designs are depicted in Figures 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10 respectively. In each
figure, the left and middle graphics are repeated from Chapter 3. The left graphic is a
screen capture of the design’s utilization from the resource editor tool, fpga editor,
provided by the manufacturer and the middle graphic is a Matlab rendering of the
“sensitive” configuration memory bits or dynamic cross section. The right graphic
is a a Matlab rendering of the “persistent” configuration memory bits or persistent
cross section. Both Matlab plots are based on data generated by the fault injection
tool.
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Table 5.4: Cross Section Predictions and Measurements
Resource
Design
Utilization
(slices) (%)
Multiplier
10,305 83.9
Counter
2,151 17.5
Synthetic
2,538 20.7
DSP Kernel 5,746 46.8

Dynamic
Cross Section (cm2 )
Predicted Measured
1.1 × 10−8 8.3 × 10−9
4.2 × 10−9 3.5 × 10−9
4.2 × 10−9
3.2−9
−8
1.1 × 10
9.5 × 10−9

Persistent
Cross Section (cm2 )
Predicted
Measured
‡

‡

2.5 × 10−9
1.7 × 10−9
2.0 × 10−10

1.6 × 10−9
1.2 × 10−9
1.1 × 10−10

Counter Array

FPGA Layout

Dynamic Cross Section

Persistent Cross Section

Figure 5.8: Comparison of resource utilization, dynamic cross section and persistent
cross section for a Counter Array design. The diagram on the left is a screen capture
of the resource layout of the design. The right and left diagrams are respectively the
dynamic and persistent cross section of the Counter Array design.

For each of the designs of Table 5.3 estimates of persistence for fault injection
exceeded the measured values of persistence by up to a factor two. These results
suggest that there is a large disparity between the estimated persistence and the
actual measured persistence. While this is true, the purpose of these tests was not
to validate the accuracy of the fault injection tool but to demonstrate the existence
of the persistence cross section and show that this component of the sensitive cross
section is very small. Both fault injection and measured results from the radiation
source prove this point. Persistence was seen in both cases and in both cases the
percentage of sensitive configuration bits that are persistent is extremely small.
The disparity in results between the fault injection tool and the measured
results from the radiation source do suggest that the methodology used to predict
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Synthetic Design

FPGA Layout

Dynamic Cross Section

Persistent Cross Section

Figure 5.9: Comparison of resource utilization, dynamic cross section and persistent
cross section for a Synthetic design.

DSP Kernel Design

FPGA Layout

Dynamic Cross Section

Persistent Cross Section

Figure 5.10: Comparison of resource utilization, dynamic cross section and persistent
cross section for the DSP Kernel design.

persistence and measure persistence needs to be improved. Several factors make
this very difficult to do. First, because of the small persistence cross section, it is
very difficult and expensive to obtain sufficient data from radiation measurements.
Second, it is very difficult to identify independent persistent upsets from a radiation
source because of the random nature of arrival time of high energy particles. In order
to limit the effect of independent particles causing a persistent failure, the particle
flux must be significantly reduced. Reducing the particle flux will require far more
time and expense to perform the test. A more detailed discussion of the disparity in
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results between the fault injection tool and radiation measurements can be found in
Appendix D.
5.4

MTBF Estimation
Systems can have varying degrees of tolerance with respect to non-persistent

and persistent functional errors. This section will define the different tolerance levels
and discuss the implications of each when calculating mean time between failure
(MTBF). The section will conclude with modified estimates of the MTBF predictions
first reported in Section 3.4.2.
5.4.1

Application Service Interruption Tolerance
As stated in Chapter 4, non-persistent and persistent errors represent tempo-

rary and permanent service interruptions respectively. Figure 5.11 depicts the typical
error modes of a temporary and permanent service interruption. Most applications
cannot tolerate permanent service interruptions, but some applications can tolerate
temporary service interruptions. By tolerating temporary interruptions of service, an
application automatically fails less often. Furthermore, focusing mitigation on circuit
elements susceptible to the more critical, permanent service interruption can significantly increase MTBF. This ability to tolerate non-persistent errors justifies analyzing
a design’s dynamic cross section for non-persistent and persistent components.
Some applications cannot tolerate any type of service interruption. These “intolerant” applications cannot tolerate temporary nor permanent service interruptions.
Either type of service interruption depicted in Figure 5.11 would be considered an application failure. Because non-persistent and persistent functional errors represent a
form of service interruption, it follows that any dynamic upset will cause an intolerant
system to fail.
Some applications, on the other hand, can tolerate temporary service interruptions. In a “tolerant” application, the left plot in Figure 5.11 simply represents a
short loss of data. Only a permanent service interruptions results in application failure. Since a “tolerant” application loses data during a temporary service interruption
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and only fails following a permanent service interruption, it follows that only upsets
in the persistent cross section cause a tolerant application to fail.

Temporary Service Interruption

Permanent Service Interruption

Figure 5.11: The diagram on the left represents a temporary service interruption, or
non-persistent errors. The diagram on the right depicts a permanent service interruption, or persistent errors.

The ability to tolerate temporary service interruptions is application specific.
Ultimately an application’s tolerance level depends on the criticality of a continuous
stream of uncorrupted output data. The user must decide an application’s level of
tolerance because it directly affects the amount and type of functional error mitigation
needed.
5.4.2

Calculating MTBF
As mentioned in Chapter 3, MTBF estimates the average time between critical

interruptions of service. Since the definition of “critical” changes with an application’s
tolerance level, calculating MTBF changes with an application’s tolerance level as
well.
Failure in an intolerant application is defined as any type of service interruption, so it follows that both non-persistent and persistent errors result in “critical”
interruptions of service. As a result, Equations 3.3 and 3.4 presented in Chapter 3
can be used to calculate MTBF in intolerant systems. The equations are repeated
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here as
λi =

Dynamic Cross Section
× Static SEU Rate,
Static Cross Section

(5.3)

and
M T BFi =

1
,
λi

(5.4)

for convenience. For the same reasons mentioned in Chapter 3, intolerant failure
rate, λi , has units of event per unit time and intolerant mean time between failure,
M T BFi , has units of time per failure.
In contrast to intolerant applications, tolerant applications only fail after a
permanent interruption of service. As a result, only persistent errors cause “critical”
interruptions of service in a tolerant system. Consequently, tolerant failure rate, λt
and tolerant mean time between failure, M T BFt , are calculated as
λt =

P ersistent Cross Section
× Static SEU Rate,
Static Cross Section

(5.5)

and
M T BFt =

1
,
λt

(5.6)

respectively. In Equation 5.5, the cross-section ratio reflects the persistent portion of
the static cross section. Since the persistent component of the dynamic cross section
is always smaller than or equal to the size of the entire dynamic cross section, λt will
always be smaller than λi . As a result, the denominator in Equation 5.6 will always
be smaller than the denominator in Equation 5.4. Thus, MTBF will always be larger
for tolerant applications.
5.4.3

Orbit-Specific MTBF Estimates
Table 5.5 is a modified version of Table 3.2, but with two MTBF values for each

combination of design, orbit and solar conditions. The two values represent MTBF
for the particular design if it cannot tolerate or can tolerate persistent functional
errors.
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Table 5.5: Modified On-Orbit Mean Time Between Failure Estimates
Design

Tolerance
Level
Intolerant

Multiplier
Tolerant

Intolerant
Counter
Tolerant

Intolerant
Synthetic
Tolerant

Intolerant
DSP
Kernel
Tolerant

Solar
Conditions
Solar Min
Solar Max
Worst Day
Solar Min
Solar Max
Worst Day
Solar Min
Solar Max
Worst Day
Solar Min
Solar Max
Worst Day
Solar Min
Solar Max
Worst Day
Solar Min
Solar Max
Worst Day
Solar Min
Solar Max
Worst Day
Solar Min
Solar Max
Worst Day

Mean Time Between Failure
(hr/failure)
†
LEO
Polar ††
GPS †††
2
2
4.1 × 10 1.6 × 10
2.5 × 102
6.1 × 102 2.1 × 102 2.4 × 102
5.6 × 102
3.0
8.5 × 10−1
∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

1.1 × 103
1.6 × 103
1.5 × 103
2.2 × 103
3.4 × 103
3.1 × 103
1.2 × 103
1.8 × 103
1.6 × 103
2.9 × 103
4.3 × 103
3.9 × 103
4.2 × 102
6.3 × 102
5.7 × 102
2.4 × 104
3.5 × 104
3.2 × 104

4.3 × 102
5.5 × 102
8.0
8.9 × 102
1.1 × 103
1.6 × 101
4.7 × 102
5.9 × 102
8.6
1.1 × 103
1.5 × 103
2.1 × 101
1.7 × 102
2.1 × 102
3.1
9.4 × 103
1.2 × 104
1.7 × 102

6.7 × 102
6.5 × 102
2.3
1.4 × 103
1.3 × 103
4.7 × 100
7.2 × 102
7.0 × 102
2.4
1.8 × 103
1.7 × 103
6.0
2.6 × 102
2.5 × 102
8.7 × 10−1
1.5 × 104
1.4 × 104
4.9 × 101

†

Low-Earth Orbit at 560 km altitude, 35.0o inclination
Polar Orbit at 833 km altitude, 98.7o inclination
†††
Global Positioning System Orbit at 22, 200 km altitude, 55.0o inclination
∗
The design has no observable persistent cross section, therefore making it impossible to calculate
tolerant MTBF for this design.
††

The results from Table 5.5 indicate that some applications’ failure rate may
substantially improve when they can tolerate non-persistent functional errors. For example, when treated as a tolerant application, the DSP Kernel fails ≈ 55× less often3 .
3

Note that the ratio between tolerant and intolerant MTBF for a particular design is constant
across all orbits and all solar conditions. This result follows from taking the ratio of tolerant
to intolerant MTBF, or Equation 5.6 to Equation 5.4 with Equations 5.5 and 5.3 substituted in
ersistent Cross Section
respectively. The resulting ratio is PDynamic
Cross Section . Thus, the ratio of tolerant to intolerant
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The Multiplier application does not have a measurable persistent cross section (see
Table 5.3). As such, the Multiplier should theoretically never experience permanent
service interruptions, or in other words, never fail as a “tolerant” application. Applications like the Multiplier with a persistent cross section substantially smaller than
their dynamic cross section substantially improve their failure rate by tolerating nonpersistent functional errors. For other applications, the tolerance distinction makes
less difference. For example, the Counter application only fails ≈ 2× less often when
treated as “tolerant”. Since the persistent cross section of the Counter design roughly
equals the size of it’s dynamic cross section, the distinction between “tolerant” and
“intolerant” is less important.
5.5

Summary
In this chapter, a qualitative method for determining circuit elements int the

non-persistent and the persistent cross sections was defined. Measurements of the
non-persistent and persistent cross sections for several designs were also presented.
The data indicates that the non-persistent and persistent cross sections exist and
can be measured for any arbitrary circuit. Designs that can tolerate non-persistent
functional errors can substantially improve their MTBF without any mitigation effort.
The next chapter will show that by leveraging the qualitative mapping from circuit
elements to cross section, MTBF can further be improved at lower resource costs by
focusing mitigation on just a design’s persistent cross section.

MTBF only depends on the size of a design’s persistent and dynamic cross sections, not the destined
orbit or solar conditions.
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Chapter 6

Functional Error Mitigation

The previous chapter showed that an application’s failure rate improves substantially when it can tolerate non-persistent functional errors. Even so, tolerant
applications still fail after persistent functional errors. To further improve a tolerant
application’s failure rate, persistent functional errors must be mitigated. Many approaches exist to mitigate functional errors, but typically an application’s complete
set of design constraints dictates the approach.
The most common method of FPGA reliability enhancement, Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), is most effective in a reliability-limited only system. In a
resource-constrained system, TMR may not be feasible. The system may simply not
have enough available resources for full triple redundancy. Furthermore, in some cases
the system cannot afford the power consumed by using 3× redundant resources in
the FPGA.
The existence of non-persistent and persistent cross sections adds a new dimension to the space of possible approaches for systems constrained by more than
just reliability. More specifically, a resource-limited FPGA application with relaxed
availability requirements can focus mitigation on just the persistent cross section to
efficiently improve reliability at minimum resource costs.
This chapter begins with a discussion of reliability, availability and cost constraints. Next, the benefits and drawbacks associated with full mitigation are discussed in terms of reliability, availability and cost. Partial mitigation, or elimination
of just a subset of an application’s functional errors, is then introduced. Next, a
novel partial mitigation strategy is introduced which focuses on just the persistent
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functional errors. The chapter concludes with measurements of cross section and
modified mean time between failure (MTBF) estimates for two applications with just
the persistent cross section mitigated.
6.1

Design Constraints
Designing a reliable system often involves many constraints beyond reliability

including availability and cost (area, resources, power etc.). Reliability is a measure
of an application’s ability to withstand failure. Availability refers to the percentage
of time an application is available and/or performing its intended function. Cost
can have many facets. In the context of this work, resource usage and/or power are
the limiting costs. Other constraints are also sometimes important, but will not be
discussed here.
In some instances a system is limited by only one design constraint.

A

reliability-limited only system requires a specific level of reliability no matter the
cost. An availability-limited only system requires maximum operation time no matter the cost. A resource-limited only system has a hard number of available resources.
In many instances a system is limited by a combination of constraints. This work
will focus on systems which are reliability and availability limited, but have a relaxed
availability constraint.
6.2

Full Mitigation
Full mitigation can typically only satisfy the constraints of a reliability-limited

only system. If the system has a resource constraint, full mitigation may not be
possible. In other words, sometimes not enough extra resources are available for the
required redundancy. Also, if the system has a power constraint, full mitigation may
not be possible.
In FPGAs, the most popular method of full functional error mitigation is
triple-modular redundancy (TMR). TMR is a simple form of single error detection
and correction (SEDAC). All circuit resources are triplicated and a majority vote
determines the circuit’s outputs.
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Lima showed that TMR can achieve 100% reliability in the face of single bit
upsets (SBU) at a certain flux [22]. However research by Rollins et al. showed that the
cost in terms of resources and power is at least 3× and can be as high as 5× [23, 24].
6.3

Partial Mitigation
Some systems do not require maximum reliability and availability. Brendon

Bridgford et al. proposed that not all applications require full TMR nor scrubbing.
They hypothesized that a system can achieve acceptable reliability with any number
of combinations of TMR and scrubbing [25]. Gary Swift et al. proposed partial
redundancy of the input/output blocks on an FPGA [26]. Vikram Chanrasekhar et
al. introduced a method of partial redundancy based on probability analysis [27].
This work will introduce a novel partial redundancy mitigation method based on a
static analysis of a circuit’s critical components.
In some systems a certain level of reliability is required, but the system has
a tight cost constraint. If the cost of full mitigation is above this constraint then
full mitigation is not feasible. In these cases partial functional error mitigation can
sometimes meet both the reliability and cost constraints. Partial mitigation schemes
incrementally add mitigation resources until a certain level of reliability is achieved.
These methods can achieve a minimum reliability level and hopefully stay within a
specified maximum cost. All functional errors are not mitigated, but the mitigation
cost is still lower than full mitigation.
Even though partial mitigation saves cost, the evidence of the persistent and
non-persistent cross sections reveals a more efficient partial approach. Traditionally
partial mitigation strategies arbitrarily mitigate both persistent and non-persistent
functional errors, but the previous chapter showed that some applications can tolerate non-persistent errors. For these tolerant applications, arbitrary partial mitigation
wastes valuable resources mitigating non-persistent functional errors which do not
cause failure. For this reason, a better partial mitigation strategy for tolerant applications focuses mitigation on just the persistent cross section. Such an approach
allocates 100% of mitigation resources to eliminating failure. As a result, this method
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realizes desired levels of reliability at a much lower cost than either arbitrary partial
mitigation or full mitigation.
Persistent-functional-error-focused partial mitigation is only possible if components can be identified, at the circuit level, which contribute to an application’s
persistence. Section 5.2 showed that a correlation exists from persistent cross section to its constituent circuit elements. This mapping allows circuits to be statically
analyzed to identify components in the persistent cross section. These identified
components can then be targeted for focused partial mitigation.
6.4

Modified Persistent Cross Section Measurements
Algorithms which can identify structures in a circuit’s persistent cross section

have been developed at Brigham Young University [28]. I assisted in the development
of an edif-based TMR tool that included these algorithms which apply TMR to just
circuit elements that contribute to an application’s persistent cross section. This tool
was used to mitigate the persistent cross section in a pair of the applications introduced in Chapter 1. Fault-injection and particle irradiation were used to respectively
measure each application’s persistent cross section.

Table 6.1: Modified Persistent Cross Section Predictions and Measurements
Design

Synthetic

DSP Kernel

†
‡

Mitigation
Level
None
Partial
Max/Full
None
Partial
Max
Full‡

Resource
Utilization
(slices) (%)
2,538
20.7
9,867
80.3
11,961 97.3
5,746
46.8
8,036
65.4
11,114 90.4
17,238 140.4

Persistent
Cross Section (cm2 )
Predicted
Measured
1.7 × 10−9 1.2 × 10−9
1.8 × 10−11
†
−10
1.5 × 10
†
2.0 × 10−10 2.8 × 10−10
2.4 × 10−12 3.4 × 10−12
3.5 × 10−12
‡
‡

Design not tested at accelerator.
Theoretical design which would require more resources than available on the XCV1000.
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Table 6.1 lists the unmitigated and partially mitigated persistent cross section
sizes. As expected, partial mitigation drastically reduced the size of the persistent
cross section in both designs. In the partially mitigated DSP kernel, its persistent
cross section sized dropped by nearly two orders of magnitude, but only increased
resource utilization by 1.4×. (Theoretically the full TMR version would increase
utilization by 3×, but as the next design shows, a practical implementation is much
larger.) Figure 6.1 graphically illustrates this reduction in cross section. Persistence
in the partially mitigated synthetic application also dropped nearly two orders of
magnitude. However in this case, resource utilization increased by 3.8×. Note that
the resource utilization increase for a full TMR version of this design was 4.7× Also
note that the persistent cross section was not completely eliminated in either design.
The remaining persistent cross section is likely from the input and output ports, and
reset and clock distribution trees, which all belong to the persistent cross section, but
could not be triplicated due to resource constraints on the FPGA.

DSP Kernel Design

Unmitigated Persistent Cross Section

Partially Mitigated Persistent Cross Section

Figure 6.1: Comparison of the DSP Kernel design’s persistent cross section before
and after partial mitigation with TMR.

6.5

Modified MTBF Estimates
Reducing persistent cross section reduces failure rate and MTBF for tolerant

applications. The cross section estimates reported in the previous section were used
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to update the MTBF estimates in Table 5.5. The results are reported in Table 6.2.
Again, MTBF values are reported in each of three distinct orbits during three different
levels of solar activity. The orbits are the same as those described in Chapter 1.
The values shown only represent MTBF for the specified application in a “tolerant”
scenario. Values are reported for each design with two different mitigation levels,
none and partial. The results corresponding to no mitigation were transferred directly
from Table 5.5. The results corresponding to partial mitigation were calculated using
Equations 5.5 and 5.6 and the cross section values in Table 6.1.

Table 6.2: Modified On-Orbit Mean Time Between Failure Estimates for Tolerant
Applications
Design

Solar
Conditions
Solar Min

Synthetic

Solar Max
Worst Day
Solar Min

DSP
Kernel

Solar Max
Worst Day

Mitigation
Level
None
Partial
None
Partial
None
Partial
None
Partial
None
Partial
Worst Day
Partial

Mean Time Between Failure
(hr/failure)
†
LEO
Polar ††
GPS †††
3
3
2.9 × 10 1.1 × 10 1.8 × 103
2.7 × 105 1.1 × 105 1.7 × 105
4.3 × 103 1.5 × 103 1.7 × 103
4.1 × 105 1.4 × 105 1.6 × 105
3.9 × 103 2.1 × 101
6.0
5
3
3.7 × 10 2.0 × 10 5.7 × 102
2.4 × 104 9.4 × 103 1.5 × 104
1.9 × 106 7.5 × 105 1.2 × 106
3.5 × 104 1.2 × 104 1.4 × 104
2.8 × 106 9.6 × 105 1.1 × 106
3.2 × 104 1.7 × 102 4.9 × 101
2.6 × 106 1.4 × 104 3.9 × 103

†

Low-Earth Orbit at 560 km altitude, 35.0o inclination
Polar Orbit at 833 km altitude, 98.7o inclination
†††
Global Positioning System Orbit at 22, 200 km altitude, 55.0o inclination
††

The results in Table 6.2 indicate that, for tolerant applications, MTBF increases in direct proportion to a decrease in persistent cross section. For example,
with partial mitigation focused on the persistent cross section, the Synthetic appli58

cation’s MTBF increased nearly two orders of magnitude in all orbits. This increase
corresponds directly to the nearly two orders of magnitude reduction in the Synthetic design’s persistent cross section, after partial mitigation, from 1.7 × 10−9 cm2
to 1.8 × 10−11 cm2 , reported in Table 6.1.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the incremental improvements in MTBF for the DSP
Kernel and Synthetic applications in a low-earth orbit during solar max. The applications are assumed to be non-persistent-error-tolerant. For both applications the far
left point represents the “static MTBF” if all SEUs caused failure. The next point
to the right indicates the unmitigated MTBF. The next point indicates MTBF after
persistent functional error mitigation. The final point indicates MTBF after maximum functional error mitigation (in both cases full mitigation was not feasible due
to the size of the FPGA). The slope of each line segment indicates the incremental
reliability gained from one additional resource. For both designs the slope of the line
between the unmitigated and partially mitigated data points is far steeper than the
slope of the last line segment to maximum mitigation. As expected, mitigating persistent functional errors in a non-persistent-error-tolerant application is significantly
more cost-effective than mitigating non-persistent functional errors.

Figure 6.2: Plot of device utilization vs. MTBF for the DSP Kernel and Synthetic
designs in a Low-Earth Orbit at Solar Max. Both applications are assumed to be
non-persistent-error-tolerant.
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6.6

Summary
Often a system has a set of design constraints which must be considered when

designing a reliable system. Three important constraints are reliability, availability
and cost. Some systems may have a reliability constraint which does not require full
mitigation. Others may have a cost constraint that does not allow full mitigation.
Yet other systems may have both a reliability and cost constraint which must be
balanced. This chapter introduced a new partial mitigation method to meet these
hybrid constraints at lower costs. The proposed strategy focuses on persistent functional errors. The results indicate that persistent-error-focused partial mitigation can
improve MTBF to acceptable levels for non-persistent-error-tolerant applications at
significantly lower costs.
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Chapter 7

Summary and Conclusion

As the previous chapter showed, an FPGA application which can give up
availability can improve reliability to acceptable levels with far fewer resource costs.
Specifically, Figure 6.2 shows that mitigation of just the persistent functional errors
in two benchmark applications improved reliability to levels nearly equivalent to the
reliability levels attained with maximum mitigation. In one design 21% fewer resources were used than full mitigation (see Table 6.1. Most of this design consists
of feedback components and thus persistent cross section. In this case, partial TMR
was less beneficial. In a second design 38% fewer resources were used than maximum
mitigation. Far less of this design consists of feedback components. Furthermore,
maximum mitigation was not full TMR mitigation. If it could have been fully triplicated, partial mitigation would theoretically use 115% fewer resources (the potential
savings would likely be larger since full TMR rarely costs just 3×). Thus in some
cases a mitigation scheme that focuses on just persistent functional errors can indeed
give up availability for a reduction in mitigation cost with nearly no loss in reliability.
The findings of this work will be of immediate benefit to any space-based
FPGA projects that have insufficient resources available for full TMR. This is immediately useful at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The mitigation method
introduced in this thesis was implemented on several FPGA applications to be used in
a LANL satellite payload scheduled for launch in late 2006. One of the applications,
the DSP kernel, was presented and discussed throughout this thesis. This application
gained nearly two orders of magnitude reliability at a theoretical savings of 53% over
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full mitigation. Other space-destined platforms with FPGAs could similarly benefit
from this work.
Other benefits of this work include finer resolution of mitigation. Designers can
select the appropriate amount of mitigation so as to not over-engineer their specific
problem. Less mitigation also provides less power consumption. This benefit is particularly attractive to space-based applications which are traditionally power-limited.
Also, less mitigation means that smaller FPGAs can be used or more functionality
can be packed into the same FPGA.
Future work is still needed to provide more options for functional error mitigation in FPGAs. Even in the context of this work more can be done to optimize
mitigation. The persistent cross section could be more finely characterized. Probability analysis could be used to statically assign mitigation priority levels in both
the persistent and non-persistent cross sections. Work has already been done by
Brian Pratt et al. to develop algorithms that incrementally mitigate the persistent
cross section and then the non-persistent cross section[28]. More work could be done
to optimize these algorithms. Other non-TMR approaches could also be developed
that are optimized specifically to mitigate either the non-persistent or persistent cross
section.
Future research should identify more cost-effective methods for FPGA reliability enhancement. Specifically, risk analysis should be incorporated into these
reliability improvement techniques. Application and domain-aware methods are the
key to future improvements in the realm of FPGA application reliability.
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Appendix A

Benchmark Designs

This chapter describes the four benchmark applications referred to throughout
this thesis. The purpose of the suite of benchmarks designs is to demonstrate the
effects of the concepts presented in this thesis for a variety of typical designs. The first
is an array of feed-forward multipliers with no internal state. This circuit represents
a typical data-flow application. The second is a large array of 400 8-bit counters
(each containing count state). This circuit represents an application with significant
amounts of internal state. The third is a synthetic application consisting of LFSRs
and a multiplier-adder tree. This circuit represents the typical mixture of data-flow
and internal state in an application. The fourth is a Digital Signal Processing (DSP)
kernel developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory. This circuit is represents a real
application. The information included in this chapter includes design functionality
and size.

Table A.1: Resource Utilization
Resource Utilization
slices (#)
(%)
Multiplier
10,305
83.9
Counter
2,151
17.5
Synthetic
2,538
20.7
DSP Kernel
5,746
46.8
Design
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A.1

Multiplier
The first application is a feed-forward multiplier depicted as a block level

diagram in Figure A.1. The design takes as inputs two 36-bit operands a and b and
computes a 72-bit output o = 8 ∗ a ∗ b. In stage one, each operand enters eight
independent parallel feed-forward multiply circuits. The output of each multiply
circuit feeds the input of one of four full adders in stage two. In stage three, the
outputs of the full-adders in stage two feeds another stage with two more full-adders.
Finally, in stage four, the outputs from stage three enters a final single full-adder. In
a Xilinx FPGA this application requires 10, 305 slices (see Table A.1). This many
slices occupies 83.9% of a Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA (see Table A.1).

Figure A.1: A feed-forward multiplier circuit [4].

A.2

Counter Array
The second application is an array of 400 8-bit counters depicted as a block

level diagram in Figure A.2. The design has no inputs and generates a 50-bit output
o. Stage one has 400 8-bit counter modules. The eight outputs of each module are
paired down to a single parity-check bit through a logical XOR operation. These
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400 bits are further reduced to 50 bits through a 3-level XOR operation. The XOR
operation allows detection of all single bit upsets in the configuration memory of this
design. In a Xilinx FPGA this application requires 2, 151 slices (see Table A.1). This
many slices occupies 17.5% of a Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA (see Table A.1).

Figure A.2: A feed-forward multiplier circuit [4].

A.3

Synthetic
The third application is a synthetic application with an array of n LFSR

modules followed by a multiplier-adder tree (see Figure A.3). Each LFSR module
contains six 20-bit LFSR circuits. Each LFSR circuit consists of a 20 bit shift-register
with an XOR’d version of a subset of its own bits as its input. In each LFSR module,
the outputs of the six LFSR circuits are XOR’d together to form a single bit output
for the module. The single bit output of the n modules feed into a multiply-add tree.
In a Xilinx FPGA this application requires 2, 538 slices (see Table A.1). This many
slices occupies 20.7% of a Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA (see Table A.1).
A.4

DSP Kernel
The fourth and final application is a DSP kernel design, depicted in Figure A.4

as a block diagram. This application was developed at Los Alamos National Labora77

Figure A.3: A synthetic FPGA design with LFSRs and a multiplier-adder tree [4].

tory. The application takes as input a stream of data. The data is filtered through a
polyphase filter and separated into 32 separate channels. The filter is followed by an
FFT and a magnitude operation. The output is also a stream of data. In a Xilinx
FPGA this application requires 5.746 slices (see Table A.1). This many slices occupies
46.8% of a Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA (see Table A.1).

Figure A.4: A digital signal processing kernel design developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory [4].
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Appendix B

Space Radiation Environment

This chapter describes both terrestrial and cosmic radiation sources, including
trapped particles and galactic and solar cosmic rays.
B.1

Trapped Radiation
Moving from the earth outward, the first major source of radiation is a re-

gion of “trapped” particles. American physicist James Van Allen is credited with
discovering this region of protons and electrons. He found that this range of particles
extends from 800 kilometers to 6 earth radii and beyond. Figure B.1 depicts these
trapped particle regions, now known as the Van Allen belts. The earth’s magnetic
field causes the particles to constantly move in a complicated pattern, shown in Figure B.2. They gyrate around and bounce along magnetic field lines. The field also
reflects the particles back and forth between regions of maximum field strength in
opposite hemispheres. In addition, electrons drift eastward while protons drift westward around the earth [5]. The Van Allen belts have electrons with energies up to
10 M eV and protons with energies up to several hundred MeV; energies high enough
to easily cause SEEs in micro-electronics.
Figure B.3 is the integral Linear Energy Transfer (LET) spectrum for trapped
protons along a hypothetical low-earth orbit at 560 km altitude and 35.0o degrees
inclination. The y-axis is the integral proton flux for one revolution along this orbit
at each energy along the x-axis. Note that particles with energy above 103 do not
exist for this orbit.

79

Figure B.1: Van Allen trapped radiation belts around the earth [2].

Figure B.2: Motion of trapped particles in the Van Allen radiation belts [5].

B.2

Cosmic Radiation
Beyond the trapped radiation belts exist more energetic particles of galactic

and solar origination. These celestial particles include electrons, with energies in the
eV to GeV range. The flux of the lower-energy particles can be significant.
Fortunately the earth’s magnetic field, or magnetosphere, protects us on the
ground from the most damaging galactic and solar particles. Figure B.4 is a graph80

Figure B.3: Integral trapped proton LET spectrum for a low-earth orbit at 560 km
altitude and 35.0o degrees inclination.

ical representation of the magnetosphere. Near the earth, a magnetic dipole model
(slightly tilted from the rotation axis and offset from the center of the earth) approximates the magnetic field [70, 71]. For this reason, the magnetosphere less effectively
deflects cosmic rays at higher altitudes, particularly near the earth’s poles. Further
away from the earth’s surface, the dipole model of the magnetic field breaks down.
Due to effects from the solar wind, the anti-solar side of the magnetic field extends
beyond 200 Re (1Re = 1 Earth Radius ≈ 6370km). For the same reasons, the sunward facing side of the field is compressed so that it only extends to approximately
10Re . As such, the ability of the magnetic field to deflect particles also decreases with
increasing altitude.
B.2.1

Galactic Cosmic Radiation
Cosmic rays of unknown origin significantly contribute to particle flux at high

altitudes above the earth and near the earth’s magnetic poles. These rays, known
as Galactic Cosmic Rays (GCR), typically consist of about 85 percent protons, 14
percent alpha particles and 1 percent heavier nuclei [5]. Particles with energy in the
GeV range also sometimes exist in GCRs. Again, these energies easily induce faults
in micro-electronics.
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Figure B.4: The earth’s magnetosphere [2].

B.2.2

Solar Cosmic Radiation
The sun also periodically ejects intense quantities of cosmic rays. The particles

in these rays can also penetrate the earth’s magnetosphere, particularly at high altitudes and near the poles, and significantly increase the particle flux at those locations
1

. The frequency and intensity of these solar ejections follows an approximate 22 year

cycle. For the first 11 years, known as Solar Minimum, the sun is relatively quiet.
For the next 11 years, known as Solar Maximum, the sun emits extreme amounts of
protons and heavy ions from time to time. These events, colloquially known as flares,
can last from a few hours to several days.
1

In general, increased particle flux will lead to more SEEs. However, the increased particle
flux from solar ejections does not disseminate down to lower altitudes. In fact, at solar maximum,
increased solar rays in the atmosphere cause the atmosphere to expand. This allows more trapped
protons to be removed from the trapped radiation belts [68]. Consequently, low-altitude particle
flux actually decreases during Solar Maximum.
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Figure B.5 is the combined integral LET spectrum for galactic and solar cosmic
rays along a hypothetical low-earth orbit at 560 km altitude and 35.0o inclination.
The y-axis is the integral flux for one revolution along this orbit at each energy along
the x-axis. Particles exist with significantly higher energies than trapped protons,
beyond 104 LET, but the flux significantly drops after about 103 LET. In addition,
the flux of even the lower-energy particles is orders of magnitude less than trapped
proton flux at the same energy. As such, trapped particles play the dominant role
in this hypothetical orbit. The opposite would be true for orbits at altitudes beyond
the radiation belts or near the earth’s poles.

Figure B.5: Integral heavy-ion LET spectrum for a low-earth orbit at 560 km altitude
and 35.0o degrees inclination.
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Appendix C

Testing Methodologies

To validate the existence the of non-persistent and persistent cross sections
it was necessary to measure their respective sizes through fault-injection and proton
irradiation experiments. The size of the cross sections was estimated using faultinjection. The estimates were validated by actually measuring the cross sections with
proton irradiation. This appendix will describe the test-fixture and methodology for
both of these tests. The limitations of each method will also be discussed and it will
be shown that fault-injection is a reliable alternative.
C.1

Test-Fixture
Both the fault-injection and proton irradiation tests used the SLAAC1-V con-

figurable computing board as a test-fixture. Figure D.1 is a schematic representation
of the SLAAC1-V. It has three Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGAs and one smaller Xilinx FPGA. FPGA X1 houses the circuit Design Under Test (DUT). FPGA X2 holds
a second, “golden”, or identical copy of the circuit programmed into X1. FPGA X0
contains difference circuitry. When the outputs of X1 and X2 do not match, X0 detects the difference and notifies the host PC. The fourth, smaller FPGA labeled XVPI
has the configuration circuitry to program X0, X1 and X2. During proton radiation
it also houses the scrubbing circuitry.
C.2

Fault-Injection
Fault-injection with respect to an FPGA is the process of emulating an SEU,

followed by scrubbing. In general, the emulation algorithm is as follows. A bit within

85

Figure C.1: The SLAAC1-V configurable computing platform.

the configuration bitstream is toggled from its correct state. The bit is left in this
corrupted state for a finite duration. The length of time generally corresponds to
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) defined in Section 4.2. An upper bound on scrubbing
time to repair, M AX(TTR) can also be used. Upon expiration of this time, the
corrupted bit is toggled again, restoring its original state.
To perform these experiments the capability of an existing fault-injection tool
developed by Eric Johnson at Brigham Young University was modified and extended.
His tool estimates the size of a design’s dynamic cross section by finding the sensitive
bits. In other words, the tool identifies which bits, when upset, cause any type of
output error. A more detailed description of this tool can be found in [4].
The primary experiment tried to identify which bits, when upset, caused persistent errors. Figure C.2 shows the sequence of events used to determine if a given
configuration bit contributes to persistent errors. At the beginning of the test, marked
by the diamond, the tool emulates an SEU by corrupting a bit in the configuration
memory of FPGA X1. Some of those result in a dynamic error, meaning the outputs of X1 and X2 no longer match. Next, the delay ts is introduced to emulate the
time that would be required for scrubbing circuitry to find and repair the corrupted
bitstream location (MTTR). At the next event, marked by the triangle, the bit is
corrected. If functional errors occurred during ts , the design is allowed to operate
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for an additional time tf to see if the errors flush. At the final event, marked by
the circle, the bit is classified. If at this point errors still exist, then the originally
corrupted bit is classified as contributing to persistent errors. The tool tests every
bit within the configuration memory of the entire FPGA and records the result.

Figure C.2: Fault-injection test time-line: Sequence of events in a single trial to test
a configuration bit for persistence.

The estimated size of a design’s persistent cross section xp is proportional to
the sum of persistent configuration bits identified in the experiment described above.
More formally, the persistent cross section is,
xp = xs ×

persistent bits
,
total bits

(C.1)

where,
xs = device static cross section.
In other words, the persistent cross section xp equals the ratio of persistent bits to
total bits multiplied by the device’s total static cross section xs . In other words, the
fraction of the original static cross section that corresponds to persistent bits.
C.3

Radiation Testing
To validate fault-injection persistent cross section estimates, proton irradia-

tion experiments were performed at Crocker Nuclear Laboratory at the University
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of California, Davis, to actually measure the persistent cross section. Here, rather
than emulate SEUs and scrubbing, energetic particles and a scrubbing circuit were
used. At Crocker the particles are 63 MeV protons. The on-board configuration controller chip (XVPI) was modified to perform scrubbing. The scrubbing circuit did a
round-robin check of the entire bitstream; reconfiguring each corrupted frame1 in the
part.
To measure persistence at an accelerator I wrote software to control the SLAAC1V while it was subjected to irradiation. The software ran on a host PC to which the
SLAAC1-V board was attached. Figure C.3 details the sequence of events used to determine if a particular bit is within the persistent cross section of a particular design.
A proton randomly induces an SEU; i.e. a configuration bit is corrupted. Within
M AX(TTR), denoted as ts , the scrubbing circuit will find and reconfigure the corrupted bit. At some point, marked by the square, the corrupted bit will potentially
cause output errors. Here the experiment begins. The DUT, configured in FPGA
X1, is allowed to operate for time tf to see if the functional errors will flush from the
design. Note that tf is set to cover both M AX(TTR) and the desired experimental
flush time. If at the end of tf functional errors still exist, then the originally corrupted
bit is classified as persistent.
The measured size of the persistent cross section, xp of a design can be calculated as,
xp =

# persistent events
,
fluence × cos θ

(C.2)

where,
θ = incident particle angle.
Here the persistent cross section is equal to the number of persistent events divided by
the product of the fluence and cosine of the incident particle angle. Where the number
of persistent events is defined to be the number of trials which caused persistent errors.
1

A frame is the smallest divisible unit of the configuration memory which can be reconfigured in
a Xilinx FPGA.
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Figure C.3: Proton irradiation test time-line: Sequence of events in a single trial to
test a configuration bit for persistence.

C.4

Testing Conclusions
Even though proton irradiation is expensive and time-consuming, it is a more

accurate representation of the radiation environment a system will face. The primary
purpose then in testing at a proton accelerator was to validate the accuracy of faultinjection predictions against proton irradiation. If it can be shown that there is a high
degree of correlation between fault-injection predictions and radiation measurements,
then the fault-injection tool can be used to make future “measurements” of cross
section with a high level of confidence.
Unfortunately testing for persistence is an intractable problem which can only
be estimated. For instance, at an accelerator the corruption of bits cannot be precisely
controlled by the user due to the random flux of particles in both space and time.
Therefore, reconciliation of upset bits to persistent errors is done by post-processing of
collected data. A detailed explanation of the post-processing methodology, including
a more detailed description of the data collection method and an extended discussion
on the limitations of testing for persistence, can be found in Appendix D.
Despite the limitations in the two testing methodologies, the data collected
indicates that fault-injection is a reliable method of measuring cross section. In all test
cases, fault-injection is at least is accurate to within 1% for measuring dynamic cross
89

section and is at least as good as an order-of-magnitude estimate of the persistent
cross section [12].
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Appendix D

Correlation of Accelerator Data to Simulation Results

In Chapter 5 a fault injection tool was introduced that can predict the size
of an FPGA design’s persistent cross section. This tool was validated using proton
irradiation testing at Crocker Nuclear Laboratory in Davis, CA to show that it can
correctly predict the cross section measured at an accelerator.
This document outlines the data collection process used at the accelerator and
the process used to correlate the results of fault-injection and proton irradiation. Section D.1 describes the accelerator hardware and Section D.2 describes the accelerator
software. Section D.3 discusses the limitations of both fault injection and accelerator
testing. Section D.4 introduces the software developed to correlate the results of fault
injection and proton irradiation. Sections D.5 and D.6 discuss correlation for sensitivity and persistence respectively. Finally, Section D.7 accounts for the differences
in persistent cross section results between fault injection and proton irradiation.
D.1

Data Collection Hardware
A SLAAC1-V configurable computing board was used as the hardware test-

fixture for radiation testing. Figure D.1 is a block diagram of the SLAAC1-V board.
It has four FPGAs on a PCI card. There are three Xilinx XCV1000s available for user
configuration, labeled X0 through X2. The fourth, smaller FPGA labeled XVPI, acts
as a configuration controller. For the persistence tests, X1 was used for the circuit
design under test (DUT) and X2 for an identical copy of X1 to be used as a “golden”
or control circuit. X0 housed the logic to compare outputs from X1 and X2. XVPI
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contained the circuitry for configuration programming and for SEU monitoring of the
X1 configuration bitstream.

Figure D.1: Block diagram of the SLAAC1v configurable computing PCI board. The
SLAAC1V has three Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGAs.

D.1.1

Output Error Detection
FPGA X0 continuously monitored the stream of outputs from the X1 DUT

and X2 golden circuits for discrepancies. On the first cycle on which a mismatch
occurred, X0 issued an interrupt via the PCI interface to indicate an output error (OE)
occurred. The interrupt remained high until it was reset externally from software.
X0 also stored several user registers. One register, R0, held the number of cycles on
which an OE occurred since the last register reset.
D.1.2

SEU Detection
FPGA XVPI continuously monitored the configuration bitstream for faults. It

used an external memory to house a “golden” copy of the bitstream for comparison.
Mismatches, i.e. faults, were logged in a FIFO by configuration bitstream offset. If
after a read of the entire bitstream it had logged one or more faults, an interrupt
was issued via the PCI interface. The interrupt remained high until it was reset
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externally from software. Note that XVPI did not correct faults. The bitstream
remained in a corrupted state until software issued data and commands to perform
partial reconfiguration.
It is important to note that, on average, a read of the entire bitstream took 22
milliseconds. As a result, most SEUs which caused functional errors were were not
reported until some time after the functional errors were reported. In other words,
OEs induced by an SEU were actually logged and timestamped before the SEU which
could have caused it.
D.2

Data Collection Software
Software running on the host PC which housed the SLAAC1-V PCI card

continuously waited for and logged interrupts issued by the test-fixture hardware.
The software also monitored the X0 user registers and sent commands for partial
reconfiguration of the bitstream. The software contained two independent threads to
perform these functions. One thread reacted to the OE interrupt and one responded
to the bitstream fault interrupt.
D.2.1

Output Error Thread
The OE monitoring thread continuously pended on the OE interrupt. Upon

an OE interrupt, the thread gained context. It then followed the sequence of events
on the time-line in Figure D.2. Figure D.3 is a more detailed flow diagram of the
operations performed by the thread. First, the thread disabled the OE interrupt,
logged a timestamp from a generator with millisecond accuracy, and immediately
went back to sleep for tf milliseconds. After tf elapsed, context returned to the
thread. At this point the thread reset the register R0 which held the number of
cycles on which an error occurred since the last register reset. It then went back to
sleep for tm milliseconds. After tm elapsed, context returned to the thread again.
At this point the thread read the contents of R0. If R0 was non-zero, or in other
words, if OEs occurred during tm the log was annotated with a flag to indicate that
the original OE (represented by the timestamp) was persistent. Otherwise a flag was
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added to the log to indicate a non-persistent OE occurred. After a persistent output
error (POE), the thread issued a global reset of X1 and X2. Finally it re-enabled the
OE interrupt and went back to sleep to wait for the next interrupt.

Figure D.2: Timeline of events in the fault-injection tool to test a configuration bit
for persistence.

D.2.2

Bitstream Fault Thread
The software also included a second thread which continuously pended on

the bitstream fault interrupt. This thread remained inactive until a bitstream fault
interrupt was issued at which time it gained context. The thread then disabled the
bitstream fault interrupt and logged a timestamp from the same generator used by
the OE thread. Next, it read each entry from the FIFO in XVPI and repaired the
bitstream at the reported location. Next to the timestamp in the log, each bitstream
offset was also added. Finally the bitstream fault interrupt was re-enabled and the
thread went back to sleep to wait for the next interrupt.
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Figure D.3: Flow diagram of the Output Error thread in the data collection software
for accelerator persistence tests.

D.3

Testing Limitations
Several factors affect the ability to measure persistent cross section. Conse-

quently there are distinct differences between the fault injection and proton irradiation methodologies. The first difference between the two testing methodologies is the
number of configuration bits tested. The fault-injection tool tests every configuration
bit while the radiation test only tests a small random subsection of the configuration
memory. Sampling limitations of the radiation test may produce slightly different
results than the exhaustive fault-injection tool.
The second difference between the two testing methodologies is the timing
of the configuration upsets. In the fault-injection tool, the configuration upsets are
carefully controlled and synchronized with the run time and flush time of the persistence test. In the radiation test, however, protons randomly arrive and cannot
easily be correlated with run time and flush time. Although the proton flux controls
the average arrival time, the inter arrival of protons follows a Poisson distribution.
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Figure D.4: Flow diagram of the Bitstream Fault thread in the data collection software
for accelerator persistence tests.
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Expectedly, secondary configuration upsets occur during the flush time tf of a trial.
If this happens, the test software falsely tags an upset configuration bit as persistent. The number of such false persistent events can be estimated through statistical
analysis.
Upsets of user flip-flops is the other factor which affected the accuracy of our
testing. Injection of faults into user flip-flops during dynamic operation is difficult
within the Virtex architecture. Fortunately, the ratio of flip-flops to configuration
memory latches is small, therefore it is a generally accepted practice to ignore flipflops during fault-injection tests. However, protons do cause SEUs within flip-flops
at an accelerator. This leads to seemingly unexplainable POEs not predicted by the
fault-injection tool. The number of such unexplainable events can also be estimated
through statistical analysis.
D.4

Data Correlation Software
Since the ultimate goal in performing radiation experiments was to validate

the use of fault-injection as an accurate method to predict cross section, the data
collected using proton irradiation had to be correlated with the data collected using
fault-injection. The first step in correlation was to parse the data collected during proton irradiation and fault-injection and store it in a suitable data structure.
Figures D.6 and D.7 are sample data files collected by the OE and RB threads respectively. Figure D.5 is a UML diagram of the classes used to store data parsed
from these files. All events are a derivative of the Entry class which simply stores a
timestamp. Each event is either a record of an OE or a bitstream fault. The only
additional information an OE Entry stores is the real-time decision made about the
persistence of that particular error. Each bitstream fault Entry holds an array of one
or more configuration upset events. Each configuration upset event in turn holds an
address or offset to the bit which was corrupted at the accelerator. In addition, each
upset event record stores a sensitive and persistent percent probability predicted by
fault-injection for that bit.

97

Figure D.5: UML diagram of the software classes used to represent the data structure
of events parsed from the data recorded at an accelerator using the data collection
software.
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Radiation Effects Tests performed at UC Davis
by LANL in conjunction with BYU
Tue Jun 29 2004
12:16:40
X1 Design: /test_designs/SSR2/ssra-new-fixed.bit
X2 Design: /test_designs/SSR2/ssra-new.bit
Frequency: 10.000000
Flush Time: 45 (ms)
Observation Time: 10 (us)
Beam Run Number: 10
OE Format:
Timestamp Decision
(note: Decision: 0=Non-Persistent, 1=Persistent)

13256
15391
15689
15963
17824
18881
18968
20408
20856

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

Figure D.6: Sample output error (OE) data log.
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Radiation Effects Tests performed at UC Davis
by LANL in conjunction with BYU
Tue Jun 29 2004
12:16:40
X1 Design: /test_designs/SSR2/ssra-new-fixed.bit
X2 Design: /test_designs/SSR2/ssra-new.bit
Frequency: 10.000000
Flush Time: 45 (ms)
Observation Time: 10 (us)
Beam Run Number: 10
RB Format:
Timestamp SMAPcnt FSMcnt SMAP_STAT_REG
[Byte-Offset Expected@Actual]. (one or more)
(note: Each entry is a pair of two lines)

13042 1 483 3d
537604 30b
13291 1 12 3d
162487 20a
13312 1 1 3d
633763 302
13374 1 3 3d
31034 c0c1
13499 1 6 3d
75518 2

Figure D.7: Sample read-back error (RB) data log.
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After the parser creates the data structure for each event, all Entries are
placed in an array in chronological order by timestamp. Figures D.9, D.12 and D.14
are typical timelines corresponding to the events stored in an Entry array. The reader
will recall from Section D.1.2 that due to the timing constraints on the SEU detection
hardware, OE events come before the SEU which would have caused it.
D.5

Sensitivity Correlation
The next step in the correlation process was to re-validate the ability of the

fault injection tool to predict the size of the dynamic cross section. Correlation of
OEs to the sensitive upsets which caused them turns out to be a rather trivial process.
For each OE reported at the accelerator it is enough to find out if it was predicted by
the fault-injection tool. Figure D.8 is a flow diagram of the logic used to evaluate each
OE. If after an OE event a configuration upset was reported with a non-zero sensitive
probability within a window w, then the fault-injection tool correctly predicted that
OE. OEs not near a configuration upset with a non-zero sensitive probability were
termed unpredicted. Some of these unpredicted OEs can be attributed to upsets of
configuration bits which the fault-injection tool incorrectly identified as non-sensitive.
The remaining unpredicted OEs likely were caused by SEUs within user flip-flops.
Figure D.9 is a hypothetical snapshot in time of events recorded at the accelerator. The OE depicted in this graphic would have been classified as predicted if the
upset which occurred during the time w had a non-zero sensitive probability.
It is important to note how the size of the window w was selected. To make
this selection, the delta time between an OE and the first upset reported after it
chronologically was evaluated. Figure D.10 is a histogram of the deltas for a particular
design. The resulting distribution is normal. As expected, the mean is approximately
22 milliseconds which corresponds to the average bitstream read time mentioned in
Section D.1.2. Excluding the outliers (which correspond to OEs caused by an upset
of a user flip-flop), the edge of the distribution is approximately 45 milliseconds. This
worst-case fault reporting time was used as the size of the window w so as to insure
that all possible upsets which could have caused an OE were included.
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Figure D.8: Flow diagram of the algorithm to classify sensitive configuration bit data
collected at an accelerator.

Figure D.9: Example timeline of events recorded at an accelerator.
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Figure D.10: Histogram of the delta time in ms between an output error event and
an configuration upset event.
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D.6

Persistence Correlation
After confirming the fault injection tool’s ability to accurately predict dynamic

cross section, several different approaches to validate its ability to predict persistent
cross section were used. Correlation of POEs to the persistent upsets which caused
them is a much more difficult process than sensitivity correlation. This section describes the inherent limitations in persistence correlation and the different algorithms
used.
D.6.1

Detection Algorithm 1
The easiest and most intuitive approach to persistence correlation is to mimic

the methodology for correlating sensitivity. For each POE reported at the accelerator,
it was determined if it was predicted by the fault-injection tool. Figure D.11 is a flow
diagram of the logic used to evaluate each POE. If after a POE event a configuration
upset was reported with a non-zero persistent probability within a window w, then
the fault-injection tool correctly predicted that POE. POEs not near a configuration
upset with a non-zero persistent probability were termed unpredicted. Some of these
POEs can be attributed to upsets of configuration bits which the fault-injection tool
incorrectly identified as non-persistent. The remaining unpredicted POEs likely were
caused by SEUs within user flip-flops.
Figure D.12 is a hypothetical snapshot in time of events recorded at the accelerator. The POE depicted in this graphic would have been classified as predicted
if the upset which occurred during the time w had a non-zero persistent probability.
Again it is important to note how the size of the window w was selected.
For this and the following persistence correlation algorithms the same approach was
used. Associated with each POE in the log files was the actual flush time tf for
that particular trial. This time varied due to operating system overhead for context
switching. Due to the dynamic length of the time tf , a different w for each POE was
used. So as to insure that all upsets which could have possibly induced the POE in
question, the worst-case bitstream fault reporting time described in Section D.5 was
added to the real flush time tf for the window w.
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Figure D.11: Flow diagram of an algorithm to classify persistent configuration bit
data collected at an accelerator.

Figure D.12: Example timeline of events recorded at an accelerator.
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D.6.2

Prediction Algorithm
The second approach looked at configuration upsets rather than POEs. This

algorithm determined if each configuration upset with a non-zero persistent probability, as predicted by fault-injection, actually caused a POE. Due to the non-binary
probability distribution of persistence an approach which weighted the occurrence of
a configuration upset by its persistent probability was used. Figure D.13 is a flow
diagram of the logic used to evaluate each persistent upset. The algorithm keeps a
running sum of the persistent probability of each persistent upset. The sum equals
a weighted prediction of the number of POE events the fault-injection tool predicted
based on which configuration bits were upset. Next, the number of upsets that had a
POE within a window w before the upset was counted. The count equals the actual
number of POE events seen. A percent error can be calculated from the equation
(predicted − actual)/predicted.
Figure D.14 is a hypothetical snapshot in time of events recorded at the accelerator. Each upset has been labeled according to its fault-injection persistent
probability. The persistent upset depicted in this graphic had a POE within a window w chronologically before it and therefore would have contributed to the count of
actual POEs. The upset’s persistent probability would have also contributed to the
sum defining the weighted prediction of POEs.
D.6.3

Detection Algorithm 2
The final approach used looked at every event within a window w after a

POE. This more detailed analysis leads to a better explanation of why each POE event
occurred. In this algorithm, each POE event was placed in one of five categories. The
different categories were 1) matched, 2) anomalous, 3) one or more sensitive upsets, 4)
one or more non-sensitive upsets, and 5) nothing in window. POEs with one or more
persistent upset within the window w were placed in the matched category. Errors
with more than three upsets within its window were called anomalous. From the
remaining POEs, those with at least one sensitive upset in the window w were placed
in the one or more sensitive category. Those with a least one upset (which by process
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Figure D.13: Flow diagram of an algorithm to classify persistent configuration bit
data collected at an accelerator.

Figure D.14: Example timeline of events recorded at an accelerator.
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of elimination could only be non-sensitive) were put in the one or more non-sensitive
category. And finally, the remaining errors (which by process of elimination could
have no upsets in their window) were placed in the nothing in window category.
D.7

Accounting for Testing Error
In his Master’s thesis, Eric Johnson explained how to determine confidence

intervals for dynamic radiation testing of cross section for FPGA applications with
respect to fault injection [4]. In this work Johnson showed that the bounds a and b
on a 95% confidence interval can be computed as
a = −2.81σ + µ

(D.1)

and
b = 2.81σ + µ,

(D.2)

where σ is the square root of the variance and µ is the mean. The magic numbers
−2.81 and 2.81 come from the 95% confidence interval for a unit normal distribution
Φ(x). For a unit normal distribution, Φ(−2.81) = 0.025 and Φ(2.81) = 0.975.
Johnson further showed that the variance σ 2 and mean µ can be computed as
σ2 =

k+1 k+2 k+1
(
−
)
n+2 n+3 n+2

(D.3)

k+1
,
n+2

(D.4)

and
µ =

where n is the number of SEU events and k is the expected number of persistent (or
sensitive etc.) events.
Based on Johnson’s derivations, 95% confidence intervals were computed for
the four designs introduced in Appendix A and referred to throughout this thesis.
The parameters, lower bound a, and upper bound b are shown in Table D.1. In
addition, the ratio of the raw persistent cross section to static cross section is also
listed for each design in column seven. This ratio is computed as
xpm :s =

1
# POE events
×
.
static cross section
fluence
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(D.5)

Only the raw measured ratio for the Synthetic design falls within the expected confidence interval. The discrepancies for the remaining designs may be explained due to
the effects of flux variations and user flip-flop upsets (see Section D.3). As a result,
the collected data was post-processed in various ways in an effort to show that the
data could fit within the expected confidence interval. The first method discarded
trials which had one or more additional SEUs within the flush time tf . The second
method only counted trials which had one or more upsets which were known to cause
persistent errors that occurred within the flush time tf . The ratio of the persistent
cross section to static cross section using these methods is computed as
xpm :s =

1
adjusted # POE events
×
.
static cross section
fluence

(D.6)

As might be expected, the second method had better agreement with fault injection.
The ratios using this method are listed in column eight of Table D.1.
In some cases adjusting the data by discarding trials moves the data to within
the 95% confidence interval. However, this adjustment also sometimes moves data
out of the confidence interval. Sometimes the raw data collected already fell within
the 95% confidence interval. Ultimately all of the data collected are close to their
expected 95% confidence interval. As Section D.3 indicated, measuring persistence
is a difficult problem. The flux, flush time and sample rate parameters can make a
significant difference in the accuracy of the collected data. In the future, more testing
could be done at much lower sampling rates with much longer flush times to collect
more accurate data.
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Table D.1: Confidence Intervals for Tested Designs

Design
Multiplier
Counter
Synthetic
DSP Kernel

Predicted
Persistence

n

0.0000 5,927
0.0187 21,068
0.0126 136,727
0.0014 30,697

expected
k

a

b

0.0010
394.0
1717.1
41.7

-0.0003
0.0161
0.0117
0.0008

0.0006
0.0214
0.0134
0.0020
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Measured
Persistence
Raw Adjusted
0.0007
0.0001
0.0132
0.0128
0.0122
0.0094
0.0026
0.0009

Appendix E

Predicting On-Orbit SEU Rates

In order to calculate Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) it is necessary to
first predict static Single-Event Upset (SEU) rates for device-orbit pairs. Many methods and associated computer programs exist to forecast on-orbit SEU rates. For this
work, the Space Radiation 5.0 (SPACERAD) [69] and CREME96 [68] software packages were used for prediction. This appendix documents the parameters necessary to
recreate the MTBF values, found in Tables 3.2, 5.5 and 6.2, based on the static SEU
rates found in Table 2.3.
E.1

Software Packages
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the space radiation environment contains elec-

trons, protons and heavy-ions of various originations. Of importance to SEU calculations are typically protons, both trapped and solar, and heavy-ions. The computer
program SPACERAD was used to predict static SEU rates from trapped protons and
solar protons. According to its website [68], SPACERAD models the ionizing space
and atmosphere environments. It includes models for trapped protons and electrons,
solar protons, galactic cosmic radiation and neutrons. In addition to SEU rates,
SPACERAD can also predict total ionizing dose, solar cell damage and Single-Event
Latchup (SEL) for any orbit or trajectory. More information can be found at the
SPACERAD website [68].
The Cosmic Ray Effects on Micro-Electronics 1996 (CREME96) suite of software programs was used to predict static SEU rates from cosmic rays, both solar
and galactic. A public web-based interface exists to access this software package [68].
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Using CREME96, heavy ion SEU rates and total ionizing dose can be predicted for
a particular orbit. More information can be found at the CREME96 website [68].
E.2

Integral Rectangular Parallelepiped Method
The underlying method in both SPACERAD and CREME96 used for static

SEU rate prediction is the well-established Integral Rectangular Parallelepiped (IR
PP) technique. More details on the procedure and mathematics of this technique can
be found in [7, 8].
E.3

Rate Categories
The energy spectrum used for IRPP SEU rate forecasting is based on particle

flux. Trapped protons, solar protons, heavy-ions and even trapped electrons all have
different models to describe their respective flux at varying locations in space. As
such, the component of a device-orbit SEU rate due to each particle type must be
computed separately.
Each particle model has different categories to describe the variations in flux
due to changing space conditions. For example, trapped proton flux has two categories, solar min and solar max, corresponding to the peak and minimum of the
approximately 22 year solar activity cycle. Heavy ion rates can also be divided into
solar min and solar max, but additional categories are also available to describe conditions during the worst week and worst day of solar activity. Consequently, it is
important to combine the separate particle SEU calculations in a meaningful and
valid manner. Table E.1 indicates which components were included for the different
categories used to report SEU and MTBF rates found elsewhere in this work.

E.4

AP-8 Trapped Proton Model
The parameters to do an IRPP prediction of trapped proton SEU rates from

within SPACERAD are found in Table E.2. The Weibull characteristics are entered
directly, but the energy spectrum is based on a independently generated file. The file it
depends on is an energy transport file. An energy transport file represents the energy
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Table E.1: Solar Condition Categories and the Set of Values Necessary to Calculate
a Total Rate
Trapped Proton
Solar Proton
Heavy Ion
Category
Solar
Solar
Solar
Solar Solar Solar Worst Worst
Min
Max
Quiet Stormy Min Max Week
Day
√
√
√
Solar Min
√
√
√
Solar Max
√
√
√
√
Worst Week
√
√
√
√
Worst Day

outside the device after it has gone through spacecraft shielding. The parameters to
create an energy transport file can be found in Table E.3. Here, no values are entered
directly, but the energy transport file does depend on both a spacecraft shielding file
and a trapped proton energy environment file, which are independently created. A
trapped proton energy environment file represents the energy spectrum outside the
spacecraft. The parameters for spacecraft shielding and trapped proton environment
files are listed in Tables E.4 and E.5 respectively. Spacecraft shielding files are standalone, or in other words, all values are entered directly, but a trapped proton energy
environment file depends on an orbit file. Orbit files are also stand-alone. The
parameters for the orbits represented in this work are listed in Table E.6.
The categories for trapped proton SEU rates are solar min and solar max. The
category is selected by the model picked for the energy environment file. (See column
column three of Table E.5.)

Table E.2: Input Parameters to Predict SEU Rates in SPACERAD due to Trapped
Protons
Energy Transport Cross Section
Spectrum
(cm2 )
∗(see Table E.3)
1.276x10−7

Energy Threshold Weibull Weibull
(MeV)
Shape
Width
10
2
30
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Table E.3: Input Parameters to Create a Trapped Proton Energy Transport File in
SPACERAD
Trapped Proton Environment Spacecraft Shielding
∗(see Table E.5)
∗(see Table E.4)

Table E.4: Input Parameters to Create a Spacecraft Shielding File in the SPACERAD
Package
Material
Density
Aluminum 2.698 g/cm3

Shell Thickness
100 mils

Table E.5: Input Parameters to Create Trapped Proton Environment Files in SPACERAD
Orbit
Orbit
Solar Max ∗(see Table E.6)

Model
Model
AP8MAX
[Epoch=1970]

Year
Year
0

∗(see Table E.6)

AP8MIN
[Epoch=1964]

0

Solar Min

Geomagnetic
Field Model
IGRF/DGRF
Internat. Geo.
Ref. Field[10]
IGRF/DGRF
Internat. Geo.
Ref. Field[10]

Peak
Flux
No

No

Table E.6: Input Parameters to Create Orbit Files in SPACERAD
Apogee Perigee Incl. Duration
Long.
(km)
(km) (deg)
(days)
Asc. Node
(deg)
o
450
450
51.6
365
0o
560
560
35.0o
365
0o
800
800
22.0o
365
0o
833
833
98.7o
365
0o
o
1, 200
1, 200 65.0
365
0o
22, 200 22, 200 55.0o
365
0o
36, 000 36, 000 0.0o
365
0o
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Asc. Node
to Perigee
(deg)
0o
0o
0o
0o
0o
0o
0o

Perigee to Precession
Spacecraft
0o
0o
0o
0o
0o
0o
0o

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

E.5

JPL 1991 Solar Proton Model
In a similar fashion to trapped protons, the component of SEU rates due

to solar protons can be determined using SPACERAD and the JPL 1991 model.
The parameters to do a Weibull prediction of solar proton SEU rates are found in
Table E.7. Again, the Weibull values can be entered directly, but the calculation
also depends on an energy transport file, representing the energy at the device after
it has gone through spacecraft shielding. The parameters to create a solar proton
energy transport file are listed in Table E.8. The energy transport spectrum for solar
protons depends on the solar proton energy environment outside the spacecraft, in
addition to the spacecraft and geomagnetic shielding. The parameters to create solar
proton environment, spacecraft shielding and geomagnetic shielding files are found in
Tables E.9, E.4 and E.10 respectively. All three file types are stand-alone.
The categories for solar proton SEU rates are Quiet magnetosphere and Stormy
magnetosphere, corresponding to the level of disturbance within the earth’s magnetic
field, typically caused by the sun. The category is determined by the field condition
selected when creating the geomagnetic shielding file.

Table E.7: Input Parameters to Predict Solar Proton SEU Rates in SPACERAD
Energy Transport Cross Section
Spectrum
(cm2 )
∗(see Table E.8)
1.276x10−7

Energy Threshold Weibull Weibull
(MeV)
Shape
Width
10
2
30

Table E.8: Input Parameters to Create a Solar Proton Energy Transport File in
SPACERAD
Trapped Proton Environment Spacecraft Shielding Geomagnetic Shielding
∗(see Table E.9)
∗(see Table E.4)
∗(see Table E.10)
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Table E.9: Input Parameters to Create a Solar Proton Environment File in SPACERAD
Model
Mission Duration (years) Confidence Level (%)
JPL 1991
1
95

Table E.10: Input Parameters to Create Geomagnetic Shielding Files for the SPACERAD Software Package
Orbit Integration Earth’s Shadow
Orbit-Average
Include
Orbit-Average
Include

E.6

Particle Arrival Field Condition
Omni directional
Quiet
Omni directional
Stormy

CREME96 Cosmic Radiation Model
The methodology for calculating SEU rates using CREME96 is very similar

to that with SPACERAD, just with a different user-interface. Just as with solar
protons and trapped protons, an IRPP prediction of SEU rates can be made. The
appropriate Weibull values for heavy ions are listed in Table E.11. The heavy ion
IRPP calculation also requires an energy transport spectrum, but CREME96 requires
it to be first converted to Linear Energy Transfer (LET). The parameters used to
create an LET file are listed in Table E.12. Again, the energy transport spectrum
being converted represents the energy at the device after it has been transported
through spacecraft shielding. Table E.13 enumerates the parameters to create an
energy transport file. The energy transport files depend on the heavy ion environment.
An heavy ion environment file can be created using the parameters in Table E.14.
In turn, the environment depends on the orbit and consequent geomagnetic shielding
in that orbit. CREME96 uses one file to represent an orbit and its geomagnetic
shielding. The parameters to create an orbit file can be found in Table E.15.
The categories for heavy ion SEU rates are solar min, solar max, worst week
and worst day. Solar min and solar max only account for the non-solar anomalous cosmic rays. Worst week and worst day account for “solar flare enhanced” flux averaged
over the respective time period.
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Table E.11: Input Parameters to Predict Heavy Ion SEU Rates in CREME96
Energy
Spectrum

X
Y
Z Funnel Weibull Weibull Weibull Weibull
(µ) (µ) (µ)
(µ)
Onset
Width Exponent X-sctn
(MeV)
(µ2 )
∗(see Table E.12) 0
0
0
0
1.2
30
2
8

Table E.12: Input Parameters to Convert an Energy Transport File to an LET Spectrum in CREME96
Energy Transport Lightest
Spectrum
z#
∗(see Table E.13)
2

E.7

Heaviest Min. Energy Device
z#
(MeV/nuc) Material
28
0.1
Silicon

Static SEU Rates
The combined SEU rates for trapped protons, solar protons and heavy ions

can be found in Table E.16. The rate for each orbit and each category is listed.

Table E.13: Input Parameters to Create an Energy Transport File in CREME96
Cosmic Radiation Environment Shielding Material
∗(see Table E.14)
Aluminum
117

Shielding Thickness (mils)
100

Table E.14: Input Parameters to Create an Energy Transport File in CREME96
Environment Lightest
Model
z#
Solar Min
1
Solar Max
1
Worst Week
1
Worst Day
1

Heaviest
z#
28
28
28
28

Geomagnetic
Shielding
∗(Table E.15)
∗(Table E.15)
∗(Table E.15)
∗(Table E.15)

Table E.15: Input Parameters to Create Geomagnetic Shielding Files in the
CREME96 Package
Apogee Perigee Incl. Duration Environment Magnetic
(km)
(km) (deg)
(days)
Model
Weather
o
450
450
51.6
365
†
†
560
560
35.0o
365
†
†
800
800
22.0o
365
†
†
o
833
833
98.7
365
†
†
1, 200
1, 200 65.0o
365
†
†
22, 200 22, 200 55.0o
365
†
†
o
36, 000 36, 000 0.0
365
†
†

Orbit
Section
Whole
Whole
Whole
Whole
Whole
Whole
Whole

1

Table E.16: Static SEU Rate Forecast for a Single Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA in
Several Different Orbits
Incl.
Solar
Solar
(deg) Minimum Maximum
(SEU/hr) (SEU/hr)
o
LEO
450
51.6
2.0x10−2
3.5x10−3
o
−2
LEO
560
35.0
2.8x10
1.8x10−2
LEO
800
22.0o 9.6x10−2
6.6x10−2
Polar
833
98.7o 6.9x10−2
5.5x10−2
o
−1
Const. 1, 200 65.0
2.5x10
2.0x10−1
GPS
22, 200 55.0o 4.5x10−2
4.6x10−1
GEO
36, 000 0.0o
4.5x10−2
5.5x10−1

Orbit

Alt.
(km)
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Worst
Week
(SEU/hr)
4.0x10−1
1.9x10−2
6.7x10−2
1.1
1.0
3.7
3.7

Worst
Day
(SEU/hr)
1.4
1.9x10−2
6.7x10−2
3.8
3.1
1.3x10+1
1.3x10+1

